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RISK ANALYSIS: THE EVOLVING IDC OFFSHORE
FORMULA
George S. Wolbert, Jr. * and
A. Kelly Williams**
INTRODUCTION
It is a matter of common knowledge in the "oil patch" that the
costs of offshore drilling platforms are escalating rapidly., Of these
costs, more than 60 percent are represented by intangibles incurred in
the drilling and development phase. 2 Although courts are admonished
to give no weight to the revenue impact of a congressionally-approved
tax incentive such as the option to expense intangible drilling and de-
velopment costs3 ("IDC"),4 the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S." or
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1. For example, the cost of the rigs involved in Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 325, 328 (1977), offshore Trinidad was in the 40 to 50 million dollar
range. According to a press release of June 24, 1986, by Shell Offshore Inc., a subsidiary
of Shell Oil Company, its Boxer platform, located 120 miles south of Morgan City,
Louisiana, in Green Canyon Block 19, cost about 100 million dollars. These figures are
for the platforms alone. When the costs of installation and the actual drilling costs are
added in, the costs range from 10 million dollars to $I billion dollars per platform. Gates
Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1461 (1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir.
1982).
2. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 555 n.10 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing
Jackson, Tax Planning Before Drilling: The Operator's Problem, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 21
(1952)). See also, Fielder, The Option to Deduct Intangible Drilling and Development
Costs, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 825 (1955); Note, Qualifying Deductible Intangible Drilling Costs
in Offshore Drilling Operations, 8 U. Tol. L. Rev. 555 n.3 (1977). Baum, Intangible
Drilling and Development Costs: Some Recurring Problems, 21 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. &
Tax'n 337 (1970), says the IDC option has been described as "the most valuable right
accorded the oil operator under the tax laws"; cf. Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of
Oil-And-Gas Taxation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1441, 1465 (1960) ("more significant than
depletion as an attractor of venture capital").
3. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
4. T.D. 4333, 11-1 C.B. 31 (1932) ("such expenditures [wages, fuel, repairs, hauling,
supplies, etc. incident to the drilling of wells] have for convenience been termed intangible
drilling and development costs").
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 48
"Service"), as the administrative agency charged with the responsibility
of collecting the revenue, necessarily must concern itself with any po-
tential loss of revenue which evinces signs of rapid growth. Accordingly,
in 1970, the Service issued Revenue Ruling ("Rev. Rul.") 70-596,1 which
sets forth the Government's interpretation of section 263(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986,6 as amended, and section 1.612-4 of the
Treasury Regulations ("Reg."), 7 as applied to offshore platforms. The
ruling conceded" that the offshore platform was "incident to and nec-
essary for the drilling of wells ' 9 even though it was useful in connection
with subsequent production activities.' 0 However, as will be discussed
later, this concession did not prevent the question from being raised
(quite unsuccessfully) in Exxon Corp. v. United States" as a subpoint
in the Government's "salvage" argument, in what the court termed was
5. 1970-2 C.B. 68.
6. Hereinafter cited as "I.R.C. §" or "section." All references are to the I.R.C.
(or the "Code") unless otherwise stated.
7. Hereinafter cited as "Reg. §" or "Prop. Reg. §."
8. Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68, 69. Linden, Review of Offshore Drilling -
What are Intangibles, 26 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 441, 472 (1975), cited this
concession and the examples in Reg. § 1.612-4 for the proposition that dual purpose (well
drilling and production) facilities would be deemed "well-drilling facilities," thus qualifying
for the IDC election.
9. Reg. § 1.612-4(a). As Linden observed in a 1975 address delivered at the South-
western Legal Foundation Institute on Oil and Gas and Taxation, the words of the
regulation could be read either to qualify all well-drilling costs for the IDC option or
only those where the wells were drilled for the production of oil or gas. Linden, supra
note 8, at 448-449. As might be expected, the I.R.S. originally took the position that
wells drilled by mobile rigs to (1) establish the existence of recoverable oil and gas in
place; (2) delineate the approximate structural boundaries thereof; (3) estimate the recov-
erable reserves; and (4) determine the optimum geographical location for a permanent
drilling and production platform did not come within the option to expense intangibles
under I.R.C. § 263(c) and Reg. § 1.612-4 but were "mere extensions of exploratory
operations," similar to geological and geophysical surveys which had to be capitalized
under Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 507 (1946), aff'd on
other issues, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947). However, after being rejected consistently by
the courts, Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325 (1977), Gates Rubber
Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456 (1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982), and
Sun Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294 (3rd Cir. 1982), the Service acquiesced in
the three cases, I.R.S. Announcement 1983-1 C.B. 1, and will not continue to litigate
the issue. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38976 (Apr. 11, 1983).
10. Mim. 6754, 1952-1 C.B. 30, sets forth the Service's conclusion that drilling and
development operations have ended and production operations have commenced when the
"Christmas tree" has been installed. See Baum, supra note 2, at 339. Mim. 6754 was
superseded by its restatement in Rev. Rul. 70-414, 1970-2 C.B. 132. Costs incurred after
this point that do not have a salvage value are generally considered to be currently
deductible as operating expenses and not IDC. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(2). See Allbright, An
Overview of Intangible Drilling and Development Costs, 28 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 283, 286
(March 1980).
11. 547 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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a "monstrous step" from the requirement that IDC's be incurred during
"drilling" and "preparation" to a disqualification eo instante at the
moment of an oil or gas strike.1 2 The main thrust of Rev. Rul. 70-596
was the Service's assertion that, while the costs of transporting manu-
factured drilling rigs and other depreciable materials and equipment to
the well site after delivery to the operator, and the costs of positioning
and erecting the platform and permanently anchoring it to the ocean
bed (together with the costs of engineering and design specifications
attributable to them) were within the option provided by Reg. § 1.612-
4, the intangible costs (including the operator's engineering and design
specification costs) incurred by the operator or his building contractor
at the onshore site, where the component parts of the platform were
fabricated and assembled, were denied optionable status. 3 The rationale
given for this distinction was a terse unsupported assertion: "Offshore
platforms are tangible property ordinarily considered as having a salvage
value, similar in nature to the nonoptional items mentioned as examples
in section 1.612-4(c) of the regulations."' 14
Over an eight year period, the I.R.S. was forced to litigate its
position in three different courts: Exxon Corp. v. United States, Stan-
dard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner 6 and Texaco Inc. v. United States.'7
Although each of the courts decided in favor of the taxpayer, their
interpretations of the regulations differed. The Service has neither ap-
pealed any of these decisions nor announced any change in its position
enunciated in Rev. Rul. 70-596. Instead, it apparently decided to forum
shop by going after Gulf Oil Corporation," presumably with the intention
of testing the waters in the Third Circuit and perhaps to secure a conflict
of opinion. In view of the extreme importance of this issue to the
industry and to the future of offshore drilling, this article will examine
the "rather unusual" history' 9 of the option and analyze the cases in
an effort to provide interpretive assistance and to develop guidelines for
future activity with respect to the option.
12. Id. at 557.
13. Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68, 69-70.
14. Id. at 69.
15. 547 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
16. 77 T.C. 349 (1981).
17. 598 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
18. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324 (1986).
19. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C., 325, 345 (1977); see also
Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 1970) ("curious"); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 340 (1986) ("complex"); Sun Co. Inc. v.
Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 296 (3rd Cir. 1982) ("peculiar").
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TiE HISTORY OF THE IDC OPTION
Until 1954, Congress refrained from enacting any express statutory
authority 20 for the option to deduct or to capitalize IDC's in its various
revenue acts and in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 ("1939 Code").
Instead, it was left to the I.R.S., then the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
to deal with the matter administratively. The IDC option made its first
appearance on February 8, 1917, in Treasury Decision 244721 (Treasury
Decisions hereinafter referred to as "T.D.") relating to the Revenue
Act of September 8, 1916,22 as follows: "The incidental expenses of
drilling wells, that is, such expenses as are paid for wages, fuel, repairs,
etc., which do not necessarily enter into and form a part of the capital
invested or property account, may, at the option of the individual or
corporation owning and operating the property, be charged to property
account subject to depreciation or be deducted from gross income as
an operating expense." ' 23 One commentator has remarked about the
cautious nature of the Treasury's venture into the matter, that is, the
ease with which the language could be expanded or contracted by the
interpretative process of case law. 24 One notes that the decision, while
taking a tentative wait-and-see approach, conceptualized the option in
terms of current expense versus capital recovery through depreciation. 2
The option was expressed similarly, although in somewhat more detail,
on January 2, 1918, in Article 170 of Regulations 3326 issued in con-
20. Fielder, supra note 2, at 827, suggests that the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat
1067, and the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 241 (1921), in Section 214(a)(10) of each
gave "a nod in the direction of the optional deduction" when they provided: "in case
of ... oil and gas wells ... a reasonable allowance of depletion and for depreciation
of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case, based upon cost
including cost of development not otherwise deducted..." (emphasis and certain omitted
words added). Moreover, the Excess Profits Tax of 1940, 54 Stat. 979 (1940), had a
provision which was codified as section 711(b)(1)(H) of the 1939 Code until repealed by
the Revenue Act of 1945, section 122a, 59 Stat. 568 (1945), and which reappeared in
substantially the same form in the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1146 (1951),
recodified in the 1939 Code as section 433(b)(9)(B). Section 711(b)(1)(H) read as follows:
"All expenditures for intangible drilling and development costs paid or incurred in or for
the drilling of wells or the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas, .
which the taxpayer has deducted from gross income as an expense, shall not be allowed
to the extent that in the light of the taxpayer's business it was abnormal [for the base
year] .... "
21. T.D. 2447, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 31 (1917).
22. 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
23. T.D. 2447, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 31, 35 (1917).
24. Fielder, supra note 2, at 827.
25. Id.; Mahin, Deduction for Intangibles, 2 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 367,
370 (1951).
26. T.D. 2960, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 126, 205 (1918). The language read: "..
such incidental expenses as are paid for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, etc., in connection
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nection with the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917.27 In neither T.D. 2447
nor in Article 170 was any mention made of the election being binding
on future years.
In Article 223 of Regulations 45,28 promulgated under the 1918
Revenue Act, 29 the language of the option was expanded to read: "Such
incidental expenses as are paid for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, etc.,
in connection with the exploration of the property, drilling of wells,
building of pipe lines, and development of the property may at the
option of the taxpayer be deducted as an operating expense or charged
to the capital account returnable through depletion. '30 The italicized
language represented the first substantive change in the regulations,.
making it clear that items which had been capitalized under the election
were, unlike the previous treatment, to be recovered through depletion
rather than through depreciation . 3  Article 223 continued: "If in exer-
cising this option, the taxpayer charges these incidental expenses to capital
account, in so far as such expense is represented by physical property,
it may be taken into account in determining a reasonable allowance for
depreciation. The cost of drilling nonproductive wells may at the option
of the operator be deducted from gross income as an operating expense
or charged to capital accounts returnable through depletion and depre-
ciation as in the case of productive wells." The regulation then stated
with the drilling of wells and further development of the property, may, at the option
of the operator, be deducted as an operating expense or charged to capital account." Id.
at 206. Note that the incidental expenses "which do not necessarily enter into and form
a part of the capital invested or property account ... " language of T.D. 2447 was
dropped by T.D. 2690. The most logical explanation for excluding this language is that
even if the "incidental expenditure" became part of the capital invested, it still could be
deducted if it otherwise qualified as an IDC under the regulation. Another interesting
change was the expansion of the right to the option, which had been initially limited to
fee owner-operators, to include lessee operators. As Marvin Collie has noted, the language
used may have been the seminal expression of the "payout period" concept. Collie, The
Intangible Drilling Costs Election - Is There A New Look?, 16 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 109,
116 (April, 1967).
27. 39 Stat. 756 (1917) (see sections 5(a)(8) and 12(b)(21)); 39 Stat. 1000 (1917).
28. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170 (1919). One notes the further broadening
of the class of optionees to include "taxpayer," and the dropping of the payout language.
29. 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) (see sections 214(a)(10) (individuals) and 234(a)(9) (corpo-
rations)).
30. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 232 (1919) (emphasis added).
31. French, Intangible Drilling Cost Practices - Nine Years Later, 13 Tul. Tax Inst.
501, 502 (1965); Mahin, supra note 25, at 370; Fielder, supra note 2, at 827. In United
States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 462 (1933), the Court held that cost
recovery of capitalized IDC's was through depletion because Art. 225 of the 1926 Act
limited depreciation to physical property such as machinery, tanks, equipment, etc. See
Galvin, supra note 2, at 1466. See also Petroleum Exploration v. Burnet, 288 U.S. 467
(1933), and Twin Bell Oil Syndicate v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 402, 412-13 (9th Cir.), aff'd
on other issues, 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
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that "[a]n election once made under this option will control the tax-
payer's returns for all subsequent years .... "32 Hence, for the first
time, taxpayers' elections, once made, became binding on all future years
unless granted dispensation by Congress or the Service.
The wording employed by Article 223 of Regulations 45 in 1919
was restated substantially verbatim in Article 223 of Regulations 62,
promulgated on February 15, 1922, 33 and likewise in Article 225 of
Regulations 65, 34 issued under the Revenue Act of 1924, 31 despite the
fact that sections 214(a)(9) 36 and 234(a)(8)" of such Act had dropped
the "based upon cost including cost of development not otherwise de-
ducted" language, which had been noted previously 38 as providing some
support for the regulation.3 9 Nor was there any change in language when
Article 223 of Treasury Regulations 69 was promulgated on August 28,
1926.40 However, the Revenue Act of 1926, upon which such regulations
were based, added a 271/2% depletion allowance by virtue of section
204(c)(2) of the Act. 41 This was a substantial change because it now
permitted the deduction for depletion to be based upon a percentage
of income from the property rather than on cost or discovery value,
and the basis in the depletable property became irrelevant insofar as a
limit on the amount of depletion was concerned. By the same token,
intangible costs, which were elected to be capitalized as part of the
leasehold cost, would no longer necessarily bring any additional recovery
by way of depletion. As a consequence, T.D. 402542 was promulgated
on June 18, 1927, granting all taxpayers a new election under Article
223 of Regulations 69 with respect to the IDC election, effective for
tax years ending on or after January 1, 1925, the effective date of the
32. T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 232 (1919).
33. T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. 207, 290 (1922) pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1921,
section 214(a)(10), 42 Stat. 227, 241 (1921).
34. T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745, 822 (1924).
35. 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
36. Id. at 270.
37. Id. at 284-85.
38. See Fielder, supra note 20.
39. Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (10th Cir. 1970).
40. T.D. 3922, 28 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 558, 635 (1926).
41. 44 Stat. 16 (1926).
42. T.D. 4025, 6-1 C.B. 75 (1927) ("In view of the change in the basis for depletion
provided by the Revenue Act of 1926, in the case of oil and gas wells, taxpayers may
make a new election as to the treatment of [IDC's] for taxable periods ending on or
after January 1, 1925, but not later than six months after the date of this decision [June
18, 1927]."). See also I.T. 2338, 6-1 C.B. 74 (1927). I.T. 2393, 6-2 C.B. 68 (1927) made
it clear that such new election to expense IDC for, and after, 1925 would not affect the
electing taxpayer's deductions for depreciation and depletion on items previously capitalized
in accordance with a pre-1925 year election.
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1926 Act. Article 243 of Regulations 7443 contained the same language
previously employed despite the availability of percentage depletion.
On March 30, 1932, the Treasury Department promulgated T.D.
4333 .44 In the preamble of the decision, the Treasury took great pains
to stress that no change in administrative policy or in the practice under
the regulations was made or was intended to have been made by this
restatement; nor was any new option or election as to the treatment of
the expenditures involved granted or intended to have been granted. The
new matter appearing in the restatement represented the practice of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue under the regulations since prior to the
promulgation of Regulations 45, on April 16, 1919. 41
The restatement, which was subsequently embodied in Article 236
of Regulations 77,46 is as follows:
Charges to capital and to expense in the case of oil and gas
wells.
(a) Items chargeable to capital or to expense at taxpayer's option.
(1) Option with respect to intangible drilling and development
costs in general: All expenditures for wages, fuel, repairs, haul-
ing, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the drilling of
wells and the preparation of wells for the production of oil or
gas, may, at the option of the taxpayer, be deducted from gross
income as an expense or charged to capital account. Such ex-
penditures have for convenience been termed intangible drilling
and development costs. Examples of items to which this option
applies are, all amounts paid for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling,
and supplies, or any of them, which are used (A) in the drilling,
shooting, and cleaning of wells; (B) in such clearing of ground,
draining, road-making, surveying, and geological work as are
necessary in preparation for the drilling of wells; and (C) in
the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipe lines, and other
physical structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells and
the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas. In
general, this option applies only to expenditures for those drilling
43. Reg. 74, Art. 243 (1929), reprinted in 138 U.S. Rev. Acts, 1909-1950: The Law,
Legislative Histories & Administrative Documents (Bernard D. Reims ed., Hein & Co.,
Inc. 1979) (hereinafter cited as "U.S. Rev. Acts").
44. 11-1 C.B. 31 (1932).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Reg. 77, Art, 236 (1933), reprinted in 139 U.S. Rev. Acts 1909-1950. The italicized
emphasis of "actual materials" in (c)(1) was preserved intact. In fact, the only change
was the deletion in Reg. 77 of the heading in T.D. 4333(a)(3): "Elections once made
under these options will control the taxpayer's returns for all subsequent years."
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and development items which in themselves do not have a salvage
value. For the purpose of this option labor, fuel, repairs, hauling,
supplies, etc., are not considered as having a salvage value, even
though used in connection with the installation of physical prop-
erty which has a salvage value. Drilling and development costs
shall not be excepted from the option merely because they are
incurred under a contract providing for the drilling of a well
to an agreed depth, or depths, at an agreed price per foot or
other unit of measurement.
(2) Option with respect to cost of nonproductive wells: In ad-
dition to the foregoing option, the cost of drilling nonproductive
wells, may, at the option of the taxpayer, be deducted from
gross income as an expense or charged to capital accounts re-
turnable through depletion and depreciation as in the case of
productive wells.
(3) Elections once made under these options will control the
taxpayer's returns from all subsequent years. Where deductions
for depreciation or depletion have either on the books of the
taxpayer or in his returns of net income been included in the
past in expense or other accounts, rather than specifically as
depreciation or depletion, or where capital expenditures have
been charged to expense in lieu of depreciation or depletion, a
statement indicating the extent to which this practice has been
carried should accompany the return.
(b) Recovery of optional items, if capitalized.
(1) Items returnable through depletion: If in exercising these
options, or either of them, the taxpayer charges such expendi-
tures as fall within the options to capital account, the amounts
so capitalized, in so far as they are not represented by physical
property, are returnable through depletion. For the purposes of
this article, the expenditures for clearing ground, draining, road-
making, surveying, geological work, excavation, grading, and
the drilling, shooting and cleaning of wells, are considered not
to be represented by physical property, and when charged to
capital account are returnable through depletion.
(2) Items returnable through depreciation: If in exercising these
options, the taxpayer charges such expenditures as fall within
the options to capital account, the amounts so capitalized, in
so far as they are represented by physical property, are returnable
through depreciation. Such expenditures are amounts paid for
wages, fuel, repairs, hauling supplies, etc., used in the installation
[Vol. 48
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of casing and equipment and in the construction on the property
of derricks and other physical structures.
(3) In the case of capitalized intangible drilling and development
costs incurred under a contract, such costs shall be subject to
the foregoing segregation for the purposes of determining the
depletion and depreciation allowances.
(c) Nonoptional items distinguished.
(1) Capital items: The option with respect to intangible drilling
and development costs in general does not apply to expenditures
by which the taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily con-
sidered as having a salvage value. Examples of such items are
the costs of the actual materials in those structures which are
constructed in the wells and on the property, and the cost of
drilling tools, pipe, casing, tubing, tanks, engines, boilers, ma-
chines, etc. The options do not apply to any expenditure for
wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., in connection with
equipment facilities, or structures, not incident to or necessary
for the drilling of wells, such as structures for storing or treating
oil or gas. These are capital items and are returnable through
depreciation.
(2) Expense items: Expenditures which must be charged off as
expense regardless of the options provided by this article, are
those for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., in con-
nection with the operation of the wells and of other facilities
on the property for the production of oil or gas. General over-
head expense, taxes, and depreciation of drilling equipment, are
not considered as capital items even when incurred during the
development of the property.
Of interest to our examination of the proper interpretation of the
IDC option as applied to offshore drilling platforms was T.D. 4333's
rearrangement of the subsection (a)(1) language from "such incidental
expenses . . . in connection with . . . drilling of wells," to "incident to
and necessary for the drilling of wells"; 47 its avoidance of the charac-
terization of the expense (T.D. 2447 through Reg. 77, Art. 236 had
characterized such expenses as "operating," while T.D. 4333 simply
called it "an expense"); and its deletion of the "returnable through
depletion" language which had caused commentators to say that the
method of cost recovery as depletion had been changed in 1919 because
of its addition by Article 223 of Regulations 45. More important, how-
47. See supra text accompanying note 13 and infra text accompanying notes 221-25.
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ever, were the addition of the (A), (B), and (C) examples of optional
items; the statement that, in general, the option applied only to expen-
ditures for those drilling and developing items which in themselves do
not have a salvage value; and the seemingly unequivocal provision that
"[flor the purposes of this option, labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies,
etc., are not considered as having a salvage value, even though used in
connection with the installation of physical property which has a salvage
value." The negation of nonoptionability of drilling and development
costs merely because they were incurred under a contract providing for
the drilling of a well to an agreed depth, or depths, at an agreed price
per foot, or other unit of measurement, was added because of the judge-
made exception which had developed 41 in the case of turnkey4 9 drilling
contracts ."
T.D. 4333 performed a bit of "housekeeping" by stating separately
the option as to nonproductive wells and describing more clearly. the
manner of making the election in the first year in which the IDC's were
incurred. It stated separately how optionable items, if capitalized, were
to be recovered through depreciation or through depletion, depending
on whether or not such items were "represented by physical property."
Perhaps the most significant change was the addition of the negative
definition of the option (i.e., what items were nonoptional) in paragraph
(c), entitled, "Nonoptional items distinguished." These were classified
into: (1) "Capital items," and (2) "Expense items." Capital items were
described generally as expenditures by which the taxpayer acquires tan-
gible property ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. Examples
given were the costs of actual materials and the cost of specifically
enumerated items such as drilling tools, pipe, casing, tubing, and the
like. Moreover, the exclusionary language was extended to IDC-type
items which were "not incident to or necessary for the drilling of wells,
such as structures for storing or treating oil or gas." The cost recovery
48. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 277, 280 (1932), aff'd, 66 F.2d 316 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673 (1933); Old Farmers Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A.
203, 208, 218 (1928), acq. 702 C.B. 30 (1928); cf. Hughes Oil Co. v. Bass, 62 F.2d 176
(5th Cir. 1932).
49. Under a turnkey drilling contract, the drilling contractor obligates himself to
furnish all supplies and equipment and perform every act required in the completion of
the well; nothing is required of the lease operator except the payment of the agreed price.
Commissioner v. Ambrose, 127 F.2d 47, 48 (5th Cir. 1942).
50. Mahin, supra note 25, at 371; Fielder, supra note 2, at 828. The rationale behind
the disqualification of the operator from using the option o expense IDC's incurred by
a drilling contractor under a turnkey contract was that the contractor did all the work,
incurred the expenses, and took the risk of cost overruns. All the operator did was to
pay a determined amount for a complete well in place. Hence, as to the operator, it was
an acquisition cost which should be capitalized. Commissioner v. Ambrose, 127 F.2d 47,
48 (5th Cir. 1942).
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method assigned to these items was depreciation. The second category
of nonoptional items, expense items, dealt with intangible items of the
same nature as IDC's (i.e., labor, fuel, repairs, etc.), but which were
incurred during the production stage" and which therefore had to be
charged off as production expense.
Except for minor grammatical changes, there were no changes in
the language of T.D. 4333 embodied in Reg. 77, Art. 236 (1933)52 and
echoed by Reg. 86, Art. 23(m)-16 (1935), 53 Reg. 94, Art. 23(m)-16
(1936),' 4 Reg. 101, Art. 23(m)-16 (1939),-" and Reg. 103, Sec. 19-23(m)-
16 (1940).56
On June 25, 1943, T.D. 527617 was promulgated. Essentially, this
decision froze Reg. 103, Sec. 19.23(m)-16 for years prior to 1943, but
for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1942, it made substantial
changes in section 19.23(m)-16. As changed, the regulation clearly made
the option available only to an "operator," who was defined as "one
who holds a working or operating interest in any tract or parcel of
land either as a fee owner or under a lease, or any form of contract
granting working or operating rights.''" This language narrowed eligi-
bility by imposing a dual test of "economic interest" in the classic
Palmer v. Bender sense 59 and a requirement that such interest must bear
all the obligations of the lease and the expenses of development, 60 but
it is not as restricted a definition as is popularly used in the field to
mean one who is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the property
51. As has been shown, the I.R.S. takes the position that the dividing line is the
"Christmas tree"; see supra note 10.
52. Reprinted in 139 U.S. Rev. Acts.
53. Reprinted in 140 U.S. Rev. Acts.
54. Reprinted in 140 U.S. Rev. Acts.
55. 4 Fed. Reg. 653 (1939), reprinted in 141 U.S. Rev. Acts.
56. 5 Fed. Reg. 390 (1940), reprinted in 143 U.S. Rev. Acts.
57. 1943 C.B. 151 (1943).
58. Id.
59. 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933) (an interest, acquired by investment, in oil or gas in
place which secures income derived from the extraction of such oil or gas, to which the
interest holder must look solely for a return of his capital).
60. Miller, The Intangible Drilling Deduction, 100 J. Acct. 40 (Sept. 1945). This
second test disqualifies the "free-riding," nonoperating interests such as oil payments,
royalty, and net profits interests. See Brooks v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 116, 122 (5th
Cir. 1970); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 327 n.2 (1977). The
current regulations, § 1.614-2(b), define an operating mineral interest to be a separate
mineral interest, as described in [I.R.C.] section 614(a), ". . . in respect of which the
costs of production are required to be taken into account by the taxpayer for purposes
of computing the limitation of 50 percent of the taxable income from the property in
determining [percentage depletion]."
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under a joint operating agreement.6' However, once one qualified as an
"operator," the IDC option was available to him whether the costs
were incurred by such operator or by a drilling contractor who was
doing the drilling or development work under any form of contract,
including turnkey contracts, except where the drilling contractor was
earning an economic interest under the contract or where the drilling
contractor's costs were properly allocable to the cost of depreciable
property. 62 The other side of the coin, that is, where drilling and de-
velopment was undertaken (directly or through a contract) for the grant
or assignment of a fraction of the operating rights, was that only the
costs which were attributable to the earned fractional interest were
optional. 63 Other than that, the operator's directly or indirectly incurred
intangible drilling and development costs were made optional, whether
incurred by him prior or subsequent to the formal grant or assignment
to him of his operating rights. 64 The option with respect to deducting
IDC's on nonproductive wells was limited to those operators who pre-
viously had elected to capitalize such costs.
Through an amendment by T.D. 5276, Reg. 103, Sec. 19.23(m)-16,
became Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23(m)-16. 65 While the availability of the option
during this time remained constant from an administrative viewpoint, 66
there was some sniping at the legal validity of the regulation by taxpayers
who sought to obtain untoward benefits by switching its legitimacy on
and off to meet their economic advantage. The Board of Tax Appeals
in the 1928 Old Farmers Oil case 67 was able to avoid facing up to the
validity of Reg. 45, Art. 223 because, although the taxpayer had deducted
61. Klayman, The New Intangible Drilling and Development Regulations and Their
Implications, 25 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 99, 102 (1967); Baum, supra note 2, at 327 n.32;
Bennion, Intangible Drilling and Development Costs, P-H Oil & Gas/Natural Resources
2002, at 2023 (1972).
62. T.D. 5276, 1943 C.B. 151, 152. This concept was expressed in Paragraph 6,
amending Regulations 103, by adding a new (b)(1)(i) to the regulation with a parenthetical
clause: "excluding amounts payable only out of production or the gross proceeds of
production and amounts properly allocable to cost of depreciable property."
63. Id.; see French, supra note 31, at 505.
64. This grant "overruled" such cases as Berkshire Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.
903 (1941), and Hardesty v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1942).
65. 8 Fed. Reg. 14931-33 (1943), reprinted in 144 U.S. Rev. Acts.
66. The Treasury Department was not the instigator of litigation challenging the
validity of the IDC regulations; indeed, it was more than willing to defend them in the
courts. Mahin, supra note 25, at 374. This was true especially of taxpayers who attempted
to "double dip" into the revenue by electing the option to expense and take the deduction,
and then, when the statute of limitations had run, sought to reduce their capital gains
on subsequent sales by increasing their adjusted basis in the property through an assertion
that the regulations were invalid, hence the expenses were capital additions under the
predecessors of I.R.C. § 1016.
67. Old Farmers Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 203 (1928).
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intangible expenses incurred in drilling a well in 1918, the court found
that such expenses were incurred not by the taxpayer, but by the "turn-
key" drilling contractor. The court said that, under such circumstances,
Old Farmers had made no IDC expenditures in 1918; instead, it had
incurred a capital acquisition cost under the turnkey drilling contract
doctrine. 6 Therefore, such capitalized acquisition cost was a proper part
of Old Farmer's adjusted basis in 1919 when it sold the property. 69
In the 1931 Sterling Oil decision,7" which also involved Article 223
of Regulations 45, the plaintiff incurred intangible drilling expenses
approximating $150,000 in 1919 and $163,000 in 1920. When it filed
its income tax return for taxable year 1919, plaintiff treated these ex-
penses as capital expenditures, which created an adjusted basis which
sufficiently offset receipts from certain sales of the leases concerned so
that net taxable income was less than the plaintiff's statutory exemption.
In February, 1921, after plaintiff had sold all its Kentucky leases and
had an opportunity to massage the figures, but before it filed in respect
of taxable year 1920, it filed an amended return for 1919, reporting a
small profit on the sales and claiming the $150,000 of IDC's as ordinary
and necessary business expenses. When the Commissioner challenged this
treatment, claiming that a binding election 7' to capitalize the expenses
had been made, the battle was on. But the argument really was whether
the taxpayer had made a binding decision to capitalize the IDC's by so
treating such expenditures in the original 1919 return. In essence, both
parties were relying on the rcgulation's validity.
The court, however, apparently sua sponte, considered whether the
Commissioner had the authority to issue a regulation which granted
taxpayers an election to treat IDC's as either a deductible operating
expense or as a capital expenditure. The court answered its self-raised
question in the affirmative, concluding that the regulation represented
a reasonable disposition of a difficult problem which fell within the
Commissioner's rule-making powers.72 The court placed substantial weight
68. See supra text accompanying note 49; A.R.R. 1234, 1-2 C.B. 140 (1922), obs.,
Rev. Rul. 67-123, 1967-1 C.B. 383; French, supra note 31, at 504-05.
69. Old Farmers Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 203, 217-18 (1928), acq. 7-2
C.B. 30 (1928).
70. Sterling Oil & Gas Co. v. Lucas, 51 F.2d 413 (W.D. Ky., 1931), aff'd, 62 F.2d
951 (6th Cir. 1933).
71. Reg. 45, Art. 223 provided: "An election once made under this option will control
the taxpayer's returns for all subsequent years." Except for certain transition rules, this
concept is still extant in the current regulations, Reg. § 1.612-4(e).
72. Sterling Oil & Gas Co. v. Lucas, 51 F.2d 413, 416 (W.D. Ky. 1931), aff'd, 62
F.2d 951 (6h Cir. 1933). The court expressed the view that it was "sounder accounting
practice" to classify IDC's as "invested capital," but it yielded to the Commissioner's
judgment in this "debatable" matter.
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on the "continued administrative acceptance and congressional sanction"
of the option, which it felt gave the regulation the force and effect of
law. 73
The Sixth Circuit's affirming opinion did not deal with the validity
of the regulation but simply approved the trial court's determination
that the "election" (in the sense of a final and deliberate choice) had
not been made in the initial return, but was made in the amended return
which followed. 74 In its affirmance, the court stressed the following
circumstances: (1) an original return (which showed no tax due) made
on the basis of an unclosed book of accounts; (2) an inexperienced
accountant's treatment of the expenses; and (3) an amended return,
which was filed prior to the filing of a return for the subsequent year
and which for the first time disclosed material facts relating to the
extent of the lease sales.
In the Dakota-Montana Oil case, 75 which involved Reg. 69, Arts.
223 and 225, the controversy raged over the characterization of IDC
recovery as depreciation or depletion. 76 The taxpayer, who had taken
271/20 depletion allowance on the gross income from the property,
sought also to deduct its IDC's on the ground that 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 986(a)(8) permitted the deduction of a reasonable allowance "for
depreciation of improvements" in addition to the deduction for deple-
tion. In support of this treatment, the taxpayer argued that the drill
hole was an "improvement" of his oil property and that no logical
distinction in accounting practice could be drawn between the cost of
such improvement and the cost of buildings and machinery placed on
the property for the operation of the well for which depreciation ad-
mittedly was allowable under Article 225. The Government's position
was that the well itself was not tangible physical property which wears
out with use so as to be depreciable property. Thus, the taxpayer's
seeming attack on the validity of the regulation was really one on the
Service's application of it. Because of this posture of the case (the
United States Supreme Court's determination upholding the Government
simply subsumed the legality of the regulation), the decision cannot be
said to be a precedential determination of validity.
Within four months, specifically on July 25, 1933, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Ramsey v. Commissioner77 did address
squarely the question whether Reg. 69, Art. 223, was a valid exercise
73. Id.
74. Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F.2d 951, 952 (6th Cir. 1933).
75. United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459 (1933).
76. See supra text accompanying note 31.
77. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673
(1933).
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of the Commissioner's power to resolve by regulation a doubt as to
the proper classification of drilling costs. Once again, the controversy
arose when a taxpayer who, during the years in question, had claimed
and received current deductions for intangible drilling and development
costs incurred in his development of oil and gas leases and then in a
subsequent sale added back to his adjusted basis the previously deducted
IDC's. When challenged by the Commissioner, the taxpayer sought to
justify his position by arguing that the items concerned were inherently
capital in nature and if the regulation was construed to permit a current
deduction of such costs (as he had done in 1922-1926, prior to the sale,
and as the Service presently was doing), the regulation was invalid as
a contravention of the provisions of the 1921,78 1924, 79 and 1926 Revenue
Acts,80 which denied a deduction for any amount paid out for permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property
or estate."' The court briskly rejected Ramsey's contentions, concluding:
(1) the regulation, while using the word "incidental," followed by the
explanatory words "wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, etc., in connection
with the drilling of wells . .. and development of the property," clearly
covered the very items that Ramsey sought now to capitalize; (2) an oil
well was not so conclusively a permanent improvement or betterment
as to preclude a regulation permitting the deduction of irrecoverable
expenses of drilling such wells as ordinary and necessary expenses in-
curred in carrying on a trade or business; (3) the regulation had been
in existence for many years during which time Congress had repeatedly
amended the revenue laws while the regulation was in full force and
effect; and (4) for many years, the regulation had been utilized by the
oil industry, acted under by the Commissioner, and recognized or ac-
cepted by the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts.
Although the validity of the option had gained nationwide accep-
tance, and by the late 1930's and early 1940's its validity appeared no
longer subject to question, 2 nagging doubts began to surface in the
Fifth Circuit. In 1943, in Hunt v. Commissioner,83 in a special concurring
78. Sec. 215 of Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, 242 (1921).
79. Sec. 215 of Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 271 (1924).
80. Sec. 215 of Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 28 (1926).
81. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316, 317 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
673 (1933).
82. Grison Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 613 (1938); cf. Estate of Goodall v. Commissioner, 391 F.2d, 775, 805 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968) (quite content to accept the validity of the
regulation). In fact, T.D. 4885, 1938-1 C.B. (Part I) 396, issued February 11, 1939, made
the IDC option (along with other outstanding regulations under "prior revenue acts")
applicable to the 1939 I.R.C. in so far as it was not inconsistent with that code.
83. 135 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1943).
19881
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
opinion, Circuit Judge Sibley expressed doubt concerning the validity
of Reg. 103, Sec. 19.23(m)-16. The majority had determined that Hunt,
who had drilled a well on certain pooled acreage, thereby acquiring
from Ohio Oil Company a one-half interest in one of the two parcels
in the pool (he had previously acquired a one-half interest in the other
parcel by assignment from the Hunt Oil Company), was entitled to elect
current expense treatment for one-half of the IDC's incurred in drilling
the well (which one-half related to his prior interest acquired from Hunt
Oil Company), but had to capitalize the other one-half of the expenses
as an acquisition cost. Judge Sibley concurred with the opinion because
that was clearly the proper result under the regulation and court de-
cisions,8 4 but he was troubled by the seemingly schizophrenic result, and
he laid the blame on the regulation.
Two years later, in what Dean Charles 0. Galvin has termed "a
gratuitous assay of the whole sweep of the regulations," 85 the same
Judge Sibley, writing for a three-judge panel8 6 of the Fifth Circuit in
F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner,8 considered the regulation as it existed
prior to the 1943 amendment"8 and concluded that the IDC expense
option contained therein was contrary to the revenue statute and hence
was invalid.8 9 The gratuitous nature of this decision is apparent from
the fact that the validity of the option was not at issue; neither the
taxpayer nor the Service had raised it. The real controversy was one of
interpretation of the regulation, that is, whether the Commissioner's
obligation well doctrine" should be extended to a situation where the
84. United States v. Sentinel Oil Co., 109 F. 2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 645 (1940); Commissioner v. Rowan Drilling Co., 130 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942);
Hardesty v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1942); cf. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22224
(July 23, 1940) 1940-2 C.B. 216, modifying Gen. Couns. Mem. 10686, 11-2 C.B. 257
(1932).
85. Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil-And-Gas Taxation, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1441, 1467 (1960).
86. Judges Sibley and Waller were on the panel in both the Hunt and F.H.E. cases;
Judge McCord was replaced by Judge Holmes in F.H.E.
87. 147 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1945).
88. Art. 23(m)-16 of Regs. 101 and 103; see supra text accompanying note 57.
89. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1945).
90. The obligation well doctrine at this point of time was that whenever drilling of
a well was undertaken in consideration for the assignment of operating or royalty rights
in a property, the cost of drilling the well must be capitalized as a cost of acquiring title
to such economic interests. See Fielder, The Option To Deduct Intangible Drilling and
Development Costs, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 825, 835-37 (1955), for the historical development
of the doctrine from its humble beginning in a 1927 General Counsel Memorandum,
GCM 932, 6-1 C.B. 241 (1927), obs., Rev. Rul. 67-123, 1967-1 C.B. 383, to the time of
the F.H.E. decision. As Fielder pointed out, extension of the obligation well to its logical
extreme would have eliminated the option because virtually all oil and gas leases cease
unless drilling is commenced within the primary term and even thereafter because of the
implied covenant for reasonable development.
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leasehold interest was not assigned expressly in consideration of drilling
and did not obligate F.H.E. to drill; however, unless F.H.E. did drill
within a limited number of days, its rights would expire. The court
could have simply affirmed the Tax Court's extension of the obligation
well doctrine from denial of the IDC option to one who drills to obtain
an interest to a denial to one who drills to keep his interest. 9'
Judge Sibley apparently was unable to confine himself to the issue
at hand. He just had to vindicate the "one judge [in Hunt v. Com-
missioner, who] then for the first time argued that the true reason for
disallowing expense deductions in the Hardesty and Hunt cases was that
the part of the regulation giving the option was void, since the making
of a producing well by one who owned the oil reserve, or became
entitled thereby to an interest in it, was a capital investment returnable
through depletion under the statute. '92 The absence of a challenge to
the option's validity in F.H.E. was breezily excused by Judge Sibley
who reasoned that taxpayers were not disposed to bite the hand that
fed them, and the Commissioner, like Shakespeare's Touchstone, 93 could
not disown his own child, as poor and ill-favored as it was. 94 Having
led himself that far down the primrose path, it was easy for the judge
to conclude that "if the option be in truth contrary to the revenue
statutes, it is void, and it is the duty of the judges to declare and
uphold the law, and disregard the regulation." 9
In order to reach a position that the regulation was contrary to the
statute, Judge Sibley had to discredit the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Ramsey. He sought to do this by stating flatly that a producing well
was a permanent improvement; 96 hence, because Ramsey had predicated
its conclusion of the option's validity partially on a doubt whether an
oil well was a permanent improvement, he was half of the way home.
The other basis for Ramsey's holding of validity was the long existence
of the regulation and the many reenactments of the statute with their
relevant parts unchanged. Judge Sibley rejected this argument as being
applicable only where a regulation resolved ambiguities or uncertainties,
but "of no force at all when a regulation is contrary to the terms of
91. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 13, 24-25 (1944). Such an extension
also was made by Tripplehorn v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 8, 10-12 (1943).
92. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 1002, 1004 (5th Cir. 1945).
93. Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act V, Scene IV. (The characterization of the
option essentially was that of Judge Sibley; the analogy was our own).
94. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 1002, 1003 (5th Cir. 1945).
95. Id.
96. Id at 1005.
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the statute." 97 Reaction from Treasury and taxpayer alike was immediate
and urgent, 98 and the court was inundated with amicus curiae briefs. 99
Judge Sibley, who denied the first motion for rehearing, was quite
evidently taken aback by the Pandora's box which his first opinion had
opened. While disclaiming any "fault in [his] previous reasoning" and
characterizing his former opinion as "a right one to have been rendered
twenty years ago,' ''° he found it "unnecessary to consider so broadly
the validity of the option" and confined the court's decision to agreeing
with the Tax Court's holding that wells drilled to get an oil property
or an increased interest in one already owned were "so clearly capital
investments in that property that no part of their cost can be called an
expense of business." 10' 1 Judge Sibley "laid to one side" the question
whether a successful oil well on property which the driller fully owns
is a "permanent improvement" and therefore a part of. the capital
investment which could not be expensed. He identified the sole issue
before the court to be whether one who does not own an oil property
and who agrees to "make" a well to obtain an interest (the Hardesty
and Hunt "obligation well" doctrine), or who has an interest in the
property which will last only for a few days unless he drills a well (the
Tax Court's extension of the "obligation well" doctrine in the trial
below), and drills to retain such interest, thereby makes a capital in-
vestment "which cannot be a mere business expense under the statute."' 0 2
While gratified by Judge Sibley's reluctant retreat from the broad
sweep of the first opinion, the industry pressed for relief both in the
Congress and before the Fifth Circuit, moving for a second rehearing.
On July 21, 1945, Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 50,103
which memorialized its recognition and approval of the provisions of
97. Id. The Judge stated "[tlhe Congress in every Revenue Act has defined expenses
and stated plainly what could not be treated as expense; and has provided for oil and
gas wells modes of depletion for returning the capital invested in them. If these provisions
contravene prior regulations, instead of approving the regulations, they annul them." Id.
98. Mahin, supra note 25, at 378; cf. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d
238 (5th Cir. 1945) ("probably a billion dollars of corrections might result in expense
deductions in tax returns made within the statutes of limitation, if the option is invalid").
99. See Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 1940);
Mahin, supra note 25, at 378.
100. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1945).
101. Id.; cf. Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 1940).
102. While the particular facts in F.H.E. involved a lease on property which apparently
had only a few days to go, the principle espoused was sufficiently broad to cover all
"unless" leases from the day the lease was granted.
103. H.R. Con. Res. 50, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945 C.B. 545. The House of Rep-
resentatives adopted the Resolution on June 19, 1945, and the Senate concurred on July
21, 1945 (legislative day, July 9, 1945).
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Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23(m)-16.104 However, notwithstanding the fact that
Resolution 50 was fully in place when the Fifth Circuit heard the second
motion for rehearing in F.H.E. Oil Co., 05 the court, in a per curiam
opinion, not only denied the motion for rehearing on the ground that
its rules did not provide for a second rehearing, but also took the
occasion to deprecate the Resolution, stating that it was not an Act of
Congress approved by the President or passed over his veto and hence
it neither made law nor changed it.06 Under the circumstances, the status
of the option's validity lay in uneasy decision. 0 7 Nonetheless, taxpayers
and the Treasury continued to follow the regulations relating to the
option,'0 and no other court ever joined the Fifth Circuit in its (with-
drawn) view as to the invalidity of the regulations grant of the option.) 9
As mentioned previously by footnote, the IDC election option regulations
had been made applicable to the 1939 Internal Revenue Code," 0 and
Reg. 118, Sec. 39.23(m)-16, which was in effect at the time that the
104. "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That in the
public interest the Congress hereby declares that by the reenactment, in the various revenue
Acts beginning with the Revenue Act of 1918, of the provisions of section 23 of the
Internal Revenue Code and of the corresponding sections of prior revenue Acts allowing
a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses, and by the enactment of the
provisions of section 711(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the deduction
for intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells, the Congress
has recognized and approved the provisions of section 29.23(m)-16 of Treasury Regulations
111 and the corresponding provisions of prior Treasury Regulations granting the option
to deduct as expenses such intangible drilling and development costs." H.R. Con. Res.
50, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945 C.B. 545.
105. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1945).
106. Id. at 858. Murray, Intangible Drilling and Development Costs of Oil and Gas
Wells, 26 Taxes 312, 315 (1948), viewed the court's comments as abandoning its consti-
tutional objections to the option as an administrative ursupation of the judicial power to
define "income" as that term was employed by the 16th Amendment. However, H.R.
Rep. No. 761, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945), reprinted in 111 U.S. Rev. Acts, which
accompanied Resolution 50, clearly expressed Congressional intent underlying the option:
"The purpose of the resolution is to remove any doubt as to the validity of Treasury
regulations giving to the taxpayer the option to either capitalize or charge to expense
intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells." (emphasis
added). The report referred to Judge Sibley's original opinion in F.H.E. and described
his position on the option's validity as "untenable." Moreover, it stated, on page 2 of
the H.R. Rep., that "Congress has approved the administrative construction adopted in
such regulations [Reg. 111, Sec. 29-23(m)-16] and has thereby given them the full force
and effect of law." It concluded by saying that ". . . your committee deems it necessary
to have Congress reaffirm that such regulations are in accordance with and have the full
force and effect of law."
107. Galvin, supra note 85, at 1467; French, Intangible Drilling Cost Practices - Nine
Years Later, 13 Tul. Tax. Inst. 501, 506 (1964) ("open question").
108. Fielder, supra note 90, at 830.
109. Mertens Law of Fed Income Tax § 24.48b; cf. Fielder, supra note 90, at 830.
110. See supra note 82.
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1954 Internal Revenue Code was enacted, merely echoed the language
of the earlier option provisions under Regulations 103 and 111.11
When the 1954 Code was adopted, congressional supporters of the
IDC option thought it best to provide express authority for it in the
new Code.112 This was done by placing, in section 263(c), an exception
to 263(a)'s general rule of no deduction for capital expenditures, reading:
"Notwithstanding subsection (a), regulations shall be prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate under this subtitle corresponding to the re-
gulations which granted the option to deduct as expenses intangible
drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells and
which were recognized and approved by the Congress in House Con-
current Resolution 50, Seventy-ninth Congress."' 3
One immediate effect of 263(c)'s enactment was to smother Judge
Sibley's retreating blast in F.H.E.'s third edition to the effect that
Resolution 50 did not make law or change a law made by a previous
Congress;" 4 the IDC option now had firm statutory authority.'" More-
over, the Senate Finance Committee's Report bespoke firmly the con-
gressional intent that "[§ 263(c) of the new 1954 I.R.C. did] not affect
the treatment now allowed by regulations relating to the deduction of
capitalization of intangible drilling and development costs in the case
of oil and gas.""16 Hence, it would be a bold court that would challenge
the validity of the regulations, even with respect to years before 1954." 7
The second effect of the enactment of section 263(c) was to render
cases dealing with the question of whether certain expenditures were
capital in nature patently useless in determining whether IDC expendi-
tures were optional because the very purpose of section 263(c) was to
provide for the IDC option where the expenses obviously were capital
expenditures described in section 263(a)." 8
Ill. A reading of Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-16 against Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-16 reveals
that the wording is identical.
112. Fielder, supra note 90, at 830.
113. I.R.C. § 263(c) (1954).
114. F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1945).
115. Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1342 (10th Cir. 1970); Exxon
Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
116. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 4629, 4714; cf. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 4025, 4202; see also Sun Co. v. Commissioner,
677 F.2d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1982).
117. Fielder, supra note 90, at 830.
118. Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1982); Sun Co. v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 1481, 1507 (1980); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.
325, 344 (1977); Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 n.7 (S.D. Tex.
1984); Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1474 (1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d
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The third impact of the inclusion of section 263(c) in the 1954 Code
was the clear signal that the IDC option had been codified as a result
of a continuing congressional objective to encourage risk-taking with
respect to," 9 and to provide an incentive for, exploration for oil and
gas. 20 Moreover, it is fair to conclude from the foregoing history of
the IDC option that Congress consistently has favored a liberal inter-
pretation of the regulation 2' in order to permit the option to fulfill its
role as an incentive to oil and gas prospecting, clearly a continuing
objective of national importance. 22 In light of this obvious concern by
Congress, it is somewhat surprising that the manner in which the option
was to perform was not addressed either in the hearings or by the
committee reports on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.123 This absence
of operative guidelines probably was the result of the enormity of the
project confronting Congress in recodifying the Code and the feeling
that the option had been sufficiently developed under the prior
regulations 24 and was best left to the administrative agency (the I.R.S.)
charged with the enforcement of the law to continue further development 25
in a flexible manner consistent with the prior regulations. 26
648 (10th Cir. 1982). One wonders if this conclusion was not presaged by the change in
language from T.D. 2447 to T.D. 2690. See supra note 26. By the same token, any idea
that IDC's were ordinary and necessary business expenses, as was suggested in Ramsey
v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316, 318 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673 (1933), was
laid to rest by the Fifth Circuit's F.H.E. [II] opinion. Linden, Review of Offshore Drilling
- What are Intangibles?, 26 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 441, 447 (1975).
119. Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1982); Standard Oil Co.
(Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 350 (1977); cf. United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d
433, 453 (5th Cir. 1969); Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1477 (1980)
(encouragement of risk-taking is the raison d'etre of the IDC option); Jackson, Tax
Planning Before Drilling: The Operator's Problem, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 21 (1952).
120. Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1982); Exxon Corp. v.
United States 547 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Murray, Intangible Drilling and Devel-
opment Costs of Oil and Gas Wells, 26 Taxes 312, 316 (1948); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 761,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
121. Gates Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1475 (1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d
648 (10th Cir. 1982); Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1481, 1508 (1980); Standard Oil
Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 68 T.C. 325, 345 (1977).
122. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Sun Co. v.
Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1982) (this incentive has assumed even
greater relevance in light of current energy problems).
123. Note, Qualifying Deductible Intangible Drilling Costs in Offshore Drilling Op-
erations, 8 U. Tol. L. Rev. 555, 560 (1977).
124. Those which a prior Congress, the 79th, had recognized and approved in H.
Con. Res. 50, i.e., Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23(m)-16 (and corresponding provisions of prior
regulations).
125. I.R.C. § 263(c).
126. The authors base their conjecture of flexibility on the use, in section 263(c), of
the words "corresponding to," but see Fielder, supra note 90, at 830 (expressing concern
that enactment of section 263(c) would tie the Service to provisions and, impliedly, to
interpretations thereof as they were in 1945 when H. Con. Res. 50 was adopted).
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Despite the congressional mandate in I.R.C. § 263(c) to prescribe
regulations "corresponding to" the IDC regulations under the 1939 Code
approved by House Concurrent Resolution 50, the Service got itself
bogged down 12 7 by the thorny "carried interest" problem. 2 The Service
published two sets of Proposed Regulations, 129 interspaced by the adop-
tion of a Final Regulation under I.R.C. § 263(c), 130 to deal with this
problem. Each of the Proposed Regulations was met by a veritable
barrage of criticism ranging from a general charge of invalidity because
they went beyond the scope of the regulations which had been two-step
127. Baum, Intangible Drilling and Development Costs: Some Recurring Problems, 21
Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 337, 355-56 (1970); Klayman, The New Intangible Drilling
and Development Regulations and Their Implications, 25 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 99, 103
(1967); Klayman, The Final Intangibles Regulations: Where Do We Stand Now?, 17 Inst.
on Oil & Gas Law & Tax'n 371, 376-82 (1966).
128. A carried interest is an arrangement between two or more co-owners of a working
interest, whereby one agrees to advance all or some part of the development costs on
behalf of the others and to recover such advances from future production, if any, accruing
to the other owners' share of the working interest. Russell & Bowhay, Income Taxation
of Natural Resources § 2.08 (1986). Most commentators categorize these deals into three
types, bearing the names of the taxpayers in the three leading cases: (1) Manahan, (2)
Herndon, and (3) Abercrombie. Manahan Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1159 (1947);
Herndon Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 628 (1946); Commissioner v. J.S. Aber-
crombie Co., 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947). In the Manahan type, approved by the Service
in Gen. Couns. Mem. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, the owner of a working interest, the
carried party, assigns all or part of his working interest to the carrying party, subject to
a right of reversion in favor of the carried party. If, and after, the carrying party has
recouped his development and operating costs from production, he then reassigns the
specified fraction of his working interest to the carried party. If the production is insufficent
to enable the carrying party to recoup his cost, the carried party's reversion never comes
into possession. In the Herndon type, the carried party assigns to the carrying party a
fraction of the working interest, together with an oil payment, carved out of his retained
fraction of the working interest, equal to the amount of the development cost incurred
by the carrying party which is attributed to the carried party's retained interest, plus
operating costs during the "pay-out" period. In the Abercrombie type, the carried party
assigns a fraction of the working interest and also gives the carrying party a mortgage
or lien on the fractional interest retained by the carried party. Wienert's Estate v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 n.l (5th Cir. 1961). Although the economics of the three
types of arrangements were virtually the same, each method gave rise to a different tax
treatment of IDC's. Klayman, the New IDC Regulations, supra note 127, at 106-08;
Baum, supra note 127, at 356-58; see also Bean, Taxation of Carried Interests in Oil and
Gas Transactions - In Retrospect and Prospect, 10 U. Kan. L. Rev. 391 (1962).
129. Prop. Reg. § 1.612-4, 21 Fed. Reg. 8446 (Nov. 3, 1956); Prop. Reg. § 1.612-4,
25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (Apr. 29, 1960).
130. T.D. 6313, 1958-2 C.B. 114, filed on September 16, 1958, which read laconically:
"3 1.263(c)-I. Intangible Drilling and Development Costs in the case of Oil and Gas
Wells - For rules relating to the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and




incorporated by I.R.C. § 263 (c) via House Concurrent Resolution 50,131
to specific attacks on the Treasury's attempts to address formally the
carried interest problem. The first (1956) set of proposed regulations
expressly permitted the full deduction of IDC's incurred by the carrying
party in Manahan situations (where the entire operating interest had
been assigned to the carrying party until full recoupment, solely out of
production, of his drilling and operating costs). 1 2 However, for the first
time, the regulation attempted to define the recoupment period, which
was given the name "complete payout period."' Thus was opened the
can of worms: once the complete payout period was defined, one im-
mediately asked what tax treatment of the carrying party's IDC's results
where the carried party's operating interest reverted before the complete
payout period terminated? 3 4
The 1956 proposed regulations set forth the rule that the carrying
party could deduct that part of his IDC's incurred which represented
the ratio which his share of the operating net income'35 bore to the
total operating net income during the complete payout period. 3 6 While
the rule was sound from a logical standpoint, it was useless as a practical
matter 3 7 because it was not always possible to compute the carrying
party's share of the operating net income on the basis of ascertainable
facts when he filed his return. 3 " Moreover, the definition of the "com-
plete payout period" did not take into account the fact that part of
the development costs could have been financed by holders of nono-
perating interests. 139
131. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 128, at 409 (went beyond); Driscoll, The Tax Re-
lationship of Oilman and Investor: The Carried Interest Problem, 15 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n
314, 332 (1957) (proposed regulations establish an entirely new pattern for treatment of
carried interests and, therefore, are invalid as not "corresponding"); but see, e.g., French,
supra note 107, at 508 (since Resolution 50 referred to prior Treasury Regulations as well
as Reg. 111, sec. 29-23(m)-16, which in itself contained one set of provisions applicable
to taxable years beginning prior to January 1, 1943 and another (different) set after
December 31, 1942, one could argue that the Treasury could adopt regulations that were
not necessarily identical, but merely which "corresponded" to those existing in 1945 when
Resolution 50 was adopted).
132. Prop. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)(4), Example (1) (1956), 21 Fed. Reg. 8446, 8447 (November
3, 1956).
133. Prop. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)(2) (1956), 21 Fed. Reg. 8446 (November 3, 1956).
134. See Klayman, The New IDC Regulations, supra note 127, at 107; Klayman, The
Final Intangible Regulations, supra note 127, at 377. This is known as a "partial carry."
135. Gross income attributable to the operating interest less operating costs, Prop.
Reg. § 1.612-4(a)(2) (1956).
136. Klayman, The New IDC Regulations, supra note 127, at 107.
137. Klayman, The Final Intangibles Regulations, supra note 127, at 378.
138. See Driscoll, supra note 131, at 326-32.
139. As Klayman, The New IDC Regulations, supra note 127, at 109, pointed out,
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As a result of the objections, the 1956 proposed regulations were
withdrawn and the 1960 proposed regulations took their place. The new
proposals maintained the official position: full deductions for Manahan
scenarios, partial deductions for Herndon types, and a "no comment"
on Abercrombie situations.' 40 However, there was an attempt to meet
the objections to the 1956 proposal. There were a number of changes
for that purpose, including a new "partial carry" rule that treated the
carrying party's interest as equating to his residual operating interest
"immediately after the complete payout period," and a new definition
of "complete payout period" which took into account the fact that part
of the development costs may have been incurred by nonoperating interest
holders.1 41 In addition, the 1960 proposed regulations carried the "com-
plete payout period" concept to the extreme of its logic, for its "ter-
minable working interest" rule would have given a carrying party an
option to deduct 100% of his IDC's if he had the entire working interest
up to the moment of complete payout even though his entire interest
terminated immediately thereafter. 142
The 1960 proposed regulations were not received with any more
enthusiasm than were the earlier proposed regulations. After a substantial
period during which the Treasury gave the matter further study and
considered a number of alternatives, 43 it determined that discretion was
the better part of valor and retreated to the 1939 Code regulations' 44
by publishing, on July 14, 1965,'14 final regulations under I.R.C. §
612,146 which not only "corresponded" to the earlier regulations but
were, in effect, identical to them,1 47 at least insofar as the definitional
paragraphs with which this article primarily is concerned, i.e., "(a)"
the complete payout period could be shortened whenever the operating interests recouped
their development costs at a faster rate than did the non-operating interests-thereby
"tilting" the wheel in favor of the carrying party-and, conversely, would be lengthened
if the nonoperating interests recouped their costs more rapidly than the operating interests,
thereby making it harder for the carrying party to obtain the full intangible deduction.
140. Klayman, The Final Intangibles Regulations, supra note 127, at 379.
141. The new definition of "complete pay-out [sic] period" was "the period ending
when the gross income, attributable to all of the operating mineral interests in the well
(or wells) equals all expenditures for drilling and development (tangible and intangible)
of such well (or wells) plus the costs of operating such well (or wells) to produce such
an amount." Prop. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)(2) (1960), 25 Fed. Reg. 3761 (Apr. 29, 1960).
142. Klayman, The New IDC Regulations, supra note 127, at 111.
143. Klayman, The New IDC Regulations, supra note 127, at 112; Klayman, The Final
Intangibles Regulations, supra note 127, at 383.
144. Klayman, The Final Intangibles Regulations, supra note 127, at 372.
145. T.D. 6836, 1965-2 C.B. 182.
146. Reg. § 1.612-4.
147. Bennion, Intangible Drilling and Development Costs: The Final Regulations, 15




the inclusionary paragraph, and "(c)" the exclusionary paragraph. The
problem of carried interests was relegated to rulings made on a situation-
by-situation basis. 14
THE LANGUAGE OF THE IDC OPTION
Despite the controversies that raged over the validity of the pre-
1954 Code regulations, the legislative history is bereft of guidance on
how the option was intended to perform in the future. The Ways and
Means Committee Report 49 accompanying House Concurrent Resolution
50 proclaimed vigorously the legal force of the regulations and bespoke
Congress' strong support of them, but it did not go into the matter of
how the option should be interpreted. Neither the Hearings nor the
Committee Reports 50 on the adoption of the 1954 Code shed any light
on the intended interpretation. 5 ' Thus, we are left with only the bare
words of the regulation" 2 and a judicial recognition that Congress favors
a liberal interpretation of the regulation."'
The Code, specifically subsection 263(c), is the appropriate starting
point. As previously noted, this subsection does not, in itself, prescribe
any rule, but instead delegates to Treasury the authority to prescribe
regulations "corresponding to" the regulations which were recognized
and approved by House Concurrent Resolution 50. 14 The only regulation
promulgated under subsection 263(c) is Treasury Regulation section
1.263(c)-i, which adroitly shifts the responsibility to section 1.612-4,'"
itself a mere republication of the earlier regulations under the 1939
Code. As in the Old Testament, the hand may be the Code's, but the
voice is that of Treasury Regulation section 1.612-4."1
The regulation is divided into five subsections. Subsection (a) explains
the general characteristics of intangible drilling and development costs
148. T.I.R. 749 (July 15, 1965), republished as Ann. 65-63, 1965-34 I.R.B. 53. For
examples of such rulings, see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-332, 1969-1.C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 70-336,
1970-1 C.B. 145, modified, Rev. Rul. 80-104, 1980-1 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-
1 C.B. 105, Rev. Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. 160.
149. H.R. Rep. No. 761, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1945).
150. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954).
151. Driscoll, supra note 131, at 326; Note, supra note 123, at 560.
152. Driscoll, supra note 131, at 326; cf. Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp.
1165, 1169 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
153. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Standard Oil
Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 386-387 (1981); Gates Rubber Co. v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1475 (1980); Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1481, 1508
(1980); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 345 (1977).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 112-26.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 127-47.
156. Cf. Genesis 27:22.
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and serves generally as a definition of expenses included in the option
to expense or to capitalize. 5 7 Subsection (b) is a classification section
and operates only after an operator has elected to charge such expen-
ditures as fall within the option ("optional" items) to capital account.
As such, it seems more dependent upon, than determinative of, the
correct interpretation which we are seeking. Subsection (c) is negatively
definitional, as it purports to describe which expenses do not qualify
for the option (termed in the regulation "nonoptional" items). Subsec-
tions (d) and (e), respectively, treat the manner of making the election,
and the effect of the option and of the election. Thus, the interpretive
-issue narrows to the proper construction of subsections (a)'" and (c). 5 9
157. As previously noted, all of the items involved are capital in nature, and, under
I.R.C. § 263(a), would be denied a current deduction but for the exception contained in
§ 263(c), the parameters of which are being explored in this article.
158. Reg. § 1.612-4(a), which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Option with respect to intangible drilling and development costs. In accor-
dance with the provisions of section 263(c), intangible drilling and development
costs incurred by an operator (one who holds a working or operating interest
in any tract or parcel of land either as a fee owner or under a lease or any
other form of contract granting working or operating rights) in the development
of oil and gas properties may at his option be chargeable to capital or to
expense. This option applies to all expenditures made by an operator for wages,
fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the drilling
of wells and the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas. Such
expenditures have for convenience been termed intangible drilling and devel-
opment costs. They include the cost to operators of any drilling or development
work (excluding amounts payable only out of production or gross or net proceeds
from production, if such amounts are depletable income to the recipient, and
amounts properly allocable to cost of depreciable property) done for them by
contractors under any form of contract, including turnkey contracts. Examples
of items to which this option applies are, all amounts paid for labor, fuel,
repairs, hauling, and supplies, or any of them, which are use-
(1) In the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells.
(2) In such clearing of ground, draining, roadmaking, surveying, and geo-
logical works as are necessary in preparation for the drilling of wells, and
(3) In the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and other physical
structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of
wells for the production of oil or gas.
In general, this option applies only to expenditures for those drilling and de-
veloping items which in themselves do not have a salvage value. For the purpose
of this option, labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc. are not considered as
having a salvage value, even though used in connection with the installation of
physical property which has a salvage value ....
159. Reg. § 1.612-4(c), which provides: (c) Nonoptional items distinguished.
(1) Capital items: The option with respect to intangible drilling and devel-
opment costs does not apply to expenditures by which the taxpayer acquires
tangible property ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. Examples
of such items are the costs of the actual materials in those structures which
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. The provisions of subsection (a), the inclusionary definition, provide
answers for the traditional "who," "what," "when," "how," and
"where" questions. In order to qualify for the option, the expenditures
must be made by (or on behalf of) an operator. 16° This represented a
change wrought by T.D. 5276, effective for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1942.161 Requiring that the optionee be an operator brings
together the risk-taker and the incentive to take the risk. The "what"
question is addressed three times in subsection (a): first in the second
sentence of the lead paragraph, which broadly enunciates the general
characteristics of those expenditures which have, for convenience, been
termed "intangible drilling and development costs"; the second time in
the examples of items to which the option applies; and the third time
in the second sentence of the foot paragraph of subsection (a) which
states that, for purposes of the option, such items are not considered
as having a salvage value even if used in connection with the installation
of physical property which does have a salvage value. Clearly, "what"
is optionable are expenditures for items such as wages (labor), fuel,
repairs, hauling, supplies, etc. 62
The answer to the question of "when" emerges from subsection (a)
as qualifying those costs of the type just discussed that are "incident
to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells
for the production of oil and gas.' 1 63 The fourth sentence of subsection
(a) eliminates any "how" question that the operator personally must
perform the drilling or development work which gave rise to the IDC's;
are constructed in the wells and on the property, and the costs of drilling
tools, pipe, casing, tubing, tanks, engines, boilers, machines, etc. The option
does not apply to any expenditure for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies,
etc., in connection with equipment, facilities, or structures, not incident to
or necessary for the drilling of wells, such as structures for storing or treating
oil or gas. These are capital items and are returnable through depreciation.
160. See supra note 158, first sentence, second clause of subsection (a).
161.' See supra text accompanying notes 57-61. Prior to that time, the optionees needed
only to be a "taxpayer." See e.g., Reg. 77, Article 236, set forth at length in text
following supra note 46.
162. Even the negative, exclusionary subsection (c) agrees that these are the items in
question; it would exclude such items only for other reasons such as lack of connection
with the drilling activity, e.g., incurred in connection with capital items used for storage
or treating or for time of incurrence, namely in the production phase of the operation.
163. It should no longer be subject to question that offshore drilling platforms are
"incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells" despite the fact that they subsequently
serve as production platforms where the drilling is successful. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 391 (1981), Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68, 69; Linden,
Review of Offshore Drilling - What are Intangibles? 26 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n
441, 472 (1975); Note, Qualifying Deductible Intangible Drilling Costs in Offshore Drilling




such costs will qualify if done for the operator by contractors under
any form of contract, including turnkey contracts. 164 The "where" ques-
tion is addressed in the next sentence, which lists examples of items
included in the option: "(1) In the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of
wells, (2) In such clearing of ground, draining, roadmaking, surveying,
and geological works as are necessary in preparation for the drilling
wells, and (3) In the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and
other physical structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells and
the preparation of wells for the production of oil and gas. ' ' 165 Obviously,
the operator must be engaged in the performance of at least one of
those activities while incurring the costs which he seeks to expense under
the IDC option. However, it is clear that offshore drilling platforms
are physical structures that are necessary for the drilling of wells and
the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas.' 66
The seeds of dissension were sown in the next two sentences: "In
general, this option applies only to expenditures for those drilling and
developing items which in themselves do not have a salvage value. For
the purposes of this option, labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,
are not considered as having a salvage value, even though used in
connection with the installation of physical property which has a salvage
value.' 1 67 Prior to these two sentences, the requirements for costs to
be optional were simply that they be: (1) of an intangible type such as
wages, fuel, etc.-for convenience termed IDC's; (2) incurred by an
"operator" (or on his behalf by a contractor); and (3) which were
incident to or necessary for the drilling of wells. Moreover, in deter-
mining what activities might be taken as included within the activities
contemplated by the third requirement, the regulation listed three types
that most certainly were within the pale: i.e., drilling, shooting and
cleaning of wells; a second type not as yet contested offshore; and "the
construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and other physical struc-
164. The development of this answer to the "how" question goes back to T.D. 4333,
I1-1C.B. 31 (1932), when the Commissioner tacked onto the end of subsection (a)'s
predecessor the following sentence: "Drilling and development costs'shall not be excepted
from the option merely because they are incurred under a contract providing for the
drilling of a well to an agreed depth, or depths, at an agreed price per foot or other
unit of measurement." Although the Service pushed hard to deny an operator the benefit
of the option where the well was drilled on a "turnkey" basis, see supra text accompanying
notes 48-50 and 67-69, it repudiated the "turnkey doctrine" in 1943 by promulgating
T.D. 5276, 1943 C.B. 151. See Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1170
(S.D. Tex. 1984).
165. Reg. § 1.612-4(a).
166. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 394 (1981); Texaco, Inc.
v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D. Tex. 1980): cf. Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-
2 C.B. 68, 69.
167. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (emphasis added).
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tures as are necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of
wells for the production of oil or gas.' ' 68 At this point in the regulation,
intangible costs associated with the constructing of offshore drilling
platforms, hauling to the offshore drilling site, erecting and anchoring
the platform to the ocean floor, and drilling for oil or gas would appear
patently to be optional IDC's.
What additional light is shed by the two sentences just mentioned?
The conclusion seems inescapable that the first sentence introduces an
additional determinant - salvage value - expressed thusly: "In general
[ordinarily], this option applies only to expenditures for those [IDC's]
which in themselves do not have a salvage value." The second sentence
is somewhat equivocal. It can be read to mean that intangible expen-
ditures such a labor, fuel, repairs, etc. (IDC's), for the purpose of the
option, do not have a salvage value as a matter of regulation, and that
this is so notwithstanding the fact that such costs may have been incurred
in connection with the installation of physical property which does have
a salvage value. 6 9 However, it may also be construed simply to be a
statement that intangible-type costs do not have salvage value "in them-
selves," and that merely because such costs may be used in connection
with, and are represented by, physical property does not necessarily
disqualify them.17 0 Section 1.612-4(b) is consistent with this negative
inference, because it states that IDC-type items which have been capi-
talized under the option are to be recovered through depreciation "in-
sofar as they are represented by physical property.""'' If being represented
by physical property constituted a disqualification of optionability, there
would be no need for this provision.
Looking at the second definitional provision of section 1.612-4,
namely subsection (c), the issue of whether an item is optional may be
approached from the opposite end of the spectrum, that is, what is not
an optional item. The structure of this exclusionary subsection roughly
mirrors that of inclusionary subsection (a) in that subsection (c) first
makes a general statement: "The option ... does not apply to expen-
ditures by which the taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily con-
sidered as having a salvage value,' ' 7 2 and then proceeds to give examples
of such excluded items.?7
168. Id. at the fifth, or "Examples," sentence.
169. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 556, 559 (Ct. Cl. 1976); cf. Texaco,
Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
170. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 395 (1981).
171. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(2).
172. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(1). Note that this paragraph deals with capital items. Paragraph
(c)(2) treats intangible items of expense which are incurred at the operation stage of
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On April 9, 1970, in a case which arose in Oklahoma, there was
some judicial gloss placed upon the expression used in section 1.612-
4(c)(1) of "tangible property ordinarily considered as having a salvage
value." In this case, Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 174 Harper Oil
Company challenged a disallowance by the I.R.S. of deductions claimed
under section 263(c) for intangible costs incurred in installing surface
casing in producing wells drilled by the company in Oklahoma. Quite
naturally, the Service pointed to the language in subsection (c)(1) of its
regulation section 1.612-4, which provided then, as it does now, that
"[tihe option [to expense or to capitalize IDC's] does not apply to
expenditures by which the taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value." Moreover, argued the Service,
the quoted subsection of the regulation gave examples of such items,
among which was casing.
Harper Oil Company's counter, which was successful in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, was that
surface casing, unlike the production string, is designed to prevent
contamination of fresh surface water strata and to prevent caving at
the surface (and blow-outs); hence, it was always cemented in place.
This made the cost of recovering the surface casing uneconomical, a
fact which was the subject of a stipulation at pretrial. In addition to
this usual circumstance, the regulations of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission, the state regulatory body with cognate jurisdiction, had
required surface casing used in the presence of fresh water strata to be
cemented and forbade its removal. Thus, there could not possibly be
any salvage of Harper's surface casing. This fact led the District Court
to reason that because surface casing in Oklahoma rarely, if ever, could
be removed, it "ordinarily" could have no salvage value. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding: (1) the absence of salvage value
did not qualify a cost for the option;' 7 (2) the District Court had too
narrowly construed the term "ordinarily" in subsection (c); and (3)
"ordinarily" should be related to casing in general and not to Oklahoma
production, and excludes them as being beyond the scope of option, time-wise. See Rev.
Rul. 70-413, 1970-2 C.B. 132 (replacing Mim. 6754, 1952-1 C.B. 30).
173. "Examples of such items are the costs of the actual materials in those structures
which are constructed in the wells and on the property, and the cost of drilling tools,
pipe, casing, tubing, tanks, engines, boilers, machines, etc." (emphasis supplied, although
T.D. 4333, 11-1 C.B. 31, which first adopted the forerunner of subsection (c)(l), in March
1932, italicized "actual materials" and all subsequent regulations continued the emphasis
through Reg. l1l, Sec. 29.23(m)-16 (1943)).
174. 425 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1970).
175. Id. at 1343. Earlier in its opinion, the court put this proposition in a slightly
different way: "The salvage value reference strikes us only as the usual, but not the
necessary characteristic of the non-option item." Id. at 1342.
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surface casing in particular. The court concluded: "Casing is casing.
And casing ordinariiy has salvage value.' ' 76
One commentator has read Harper Oil to stand for the proposition
that the test to be used in determining whether tangible property or-
dinarily has a salvage value is objective in nature. 77 But even if one
embraced the concept that "casing is casing" and casing "ordinarily"
has salvage value, does it necessarily follow that the intangible costs
expended in connection with tangible property (casing) which ordinarily
has salvage value are made nonoptional? To say that it does would
appear to read out of the regulation the language of subsection (a):
"For the purposes of this option, labor, fuel, [and other IDC types of
expenditure] are not considered as having a salvage value, even though
used in connection with the installation of physical property which has
a salvage value.' ' 78 One way of attempting to give the language of each
subsection a meaning would be to limit the "ordinarily considered to
have salvage value" concept to the determination of the optionability
of tangible property such as the "actual materials" mentioned nonde-
finitively, and the physical property items such as drilling tools, pipe,
casing, tubing, etc., which were specifically enumerated in subsection
(c), and not to utilize it in connection with the expensible intangible
items which subsection (a) designated as IDC's (labor, fuel, repairs,
hauling, supplies, etc.). 79 However, this appears to be educing from
subsection (a) the concept that IDC's are IDC's, and are nonsalvageable
per se.' s0 One wonders whether this approach does not treat subsection
(c) as roughly as the "casing is casing" line of reasoning treated sub-
section (a).
In attempting to resolve this dilemma as it impacts offshore drilling
IDC's, we must remember that the development of the IDC option from
its seminal appearance in a 1917 Treasury Decision' 8' through its ex-
pansions in Article 170 of Regulations 33, Article 223 of Regulations
45, Treasury Decisions 4333, in 1933, 5276, in 1943,182 and contractions
at the behest of the Service' 83 in the case of obligation wells, acquisition
176. Id. at 1343.
177. Note, supra note 163, at 561.
178. Reg. 1.612-4(a).
179. This appears to be the approach taken by Judge Davis, concurring in Exxon
Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 559-60 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
180. The Tax Court in Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 387-
88 (1981), so reads the Exxon case, especially Judge Davis' concurring opinion.
181. T.D. 2447, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 31 (1917).
182. This development is traced in the text accompanying supra notes 20-64.
183. The practice of the Treasury to ignore or to erode its own regulations and rulings
when it can collect more revenue by doing so has been described by an ex-Treasury officer
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wells, turnkey drilling contracts and the like, all took place within the
framework of the onshore drilling industry. It was not until the impact
of the swiftly expanding offshore drilling industry with its rapidly es-
calating costs that the Service apparently concluded that the regulation
was too all-embracing for current conditions. It sought to cope with
the perceived revenue loss by issuing Revenue Ruling 70-596.1 4 Thus
was the issue first addressed in the context of offshore drilling.', 5
THE NATURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING
Although offshore drilling resembles onshore drilling in certain re-
spects, there are several important differences which pose significant
problems not found in the onshore environment. Generally, the lessor
will be either the federal government or a littoral state government. The
acreage per lease is substantially greater than that of its onshore coun-
terpart, and the cost of securing the lease, for the most part via a
competitive sealed bidding process, is astronomically greater.
Onshore, the operator merely moves a drilling rig to the drill site,
drills the well, and if oil or gas is discovered in commercial quantities,
he uses the same rig to run the casing and tubing strings and otherwise
to complete the well for production. The cellar, well-head, flow or lead
lines, auxiliary separating and treating facilities, and lease storage tankage
are located right on the lease. However, offshore wells drilled to de-
termine the presence, quantity, and areal extent of the producing for-
mations generally will be drilled from mobile rigs.8 6 In the fortutious
event that this drillstem exploration'17 proves up a commercially recov-
erable accumulation of oil or gas, a permanent drilling and production
as "bizarre administrative behavior." Eisenstein, A Critical View of the Treasury, 15 Inst.
on Fed. Tax'n 21, 30 (1957). This comment may be a bit unjust as applied to the Service's
attempt to contain its own authorization of the IDC option "within bounds" prior to
the congressional codification of the regulation in section 263(c) of the 1954 internal
Revenue Code. After the legislative imprimatur, further erosive attempts by the I.R.S.
can properly be viewed as "bizarre."
184. 1970-2 C.B. 68. Judge Davis has characterized the ruling as an attempt "to read
[the IDC] regulation in a drastic new way." Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d
548, 560 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Davis, J. concurring).
185. Note, supra note 163, at 561.
186. E.g., Sun Co. v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294, 295 (3d Cir. 1982); Gates Rubber
Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1456, 1459-1460 (1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d 648 (10th Cir.
1982); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 328-29 (1977).
187. Geological and geophysical surveys may have located the presence of a promising
structure; "bright spot" technology might give an indication of the presence of a gas or
liquid; but the drillstem is the final arbiter of whether "paying quantities" of petroleum
are at hand. Linden, supra note 163, at 442.
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platform will be installed near the geographical center 8 1 of the reservoir
in order to develop and produce the zone.
Although the activity in the mid-1960's frequently involved tender
platforms which anchored a barge or tender alongside the platform
during drilling to accommodate and store part of the drill pipe and
other materials used in the drilling, by far the predominate type now
used, as the work has moved further offshore, is the self-contained
platform. These were developed to decrease the number of work stop-
pages that were brought about by rough weather which required the
disconnection of the tender.8 9
As many as thirty-six producing wells can be drilled directionally
from the platform so as to achieve the optimum drainage from the
reservoir.' 90 The number of wells per platform, as well as the number
of platforms per reservoir, depends upon the size, depth, and config-
uration of the reservoir.' 9' The design of the platform itself is a function
of water depth, tide, storm incidence, 92 wave force, soil conditions, and
number and depth of wells desired. 93 As a result, no two platforms
have the same design criteria, although the basic structural design is
similar for all self-contained drilling and production platforms 94 After
the design criteria are accumulated, detailed plans and specifications are
prepared. In the case of most large companies, the design work is
performed by its own engineers, aided by consultants in such specialties
as soil stability and bearing capacity, meteorology, and oceanography. 95
All these factors are fed into a computer, and the output therefrom is
used to develop plans and specifications for each platform.
188. As noted by Linden, frequently the platform will be set when only three sides
of the reservoir have been delineated (assuming that the exploratory wells drilled to that
point of time have established the economic viability of the project). Linden, supra note
163, at 443. This is a function of the time value of money and the time constraints of
the lease terms.
189. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 328 (1986).
190. Linden, supra note 163, at 443.
191. Id. Needless to say, the expected gas/oil ratio ("GOR") is a very important
factor. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 329 (1986).
192. Every recorded storm since the early -1900's, at least since the maintenance of
reliable records, is plotted. Recurring patterns can be detected and probability or "survivor"
curves for each location can be constructed.
193. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 359 (1981); Texaco, Inc.
v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1167-68 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
194. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 328 (1986). Therefore, in practice,
each platform is custom-designed for one particular location and is seldom used in a
different location. Linden, supra note 163, at 471.
195. Because of the cost, and importance, of the platforms, designers usually build
in an expected "100-year storm" and its partner, the 100-year storm wave. There is an
additional lateral stress problem arising from the soil conditions in the Mississippi Delta.
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Once the plans and specifications have been developed, the project
is put out for competitive bids or selective negotiation for the onshore
construction of as much as can be accomplished onshore. Because of
the magnitude of the work and the degree of specialization involved,
the majority of the successful contractors are shipyards or large con-
tractors with marine divisions. It is customary for the operator to have
a "live-in" project manager, together with a sufficient number of en-
gineers and welding inspectors from the operator's staff to oversee the
work of the onshore fabrication contractor and to ensure that the
platform is built in conformity with the plans, drawings, and specifi-
cations of the operator. While it is customary for large operators to
supply or arrange for the furnishing of large items of materials to the
contractor in order to minimize the costs of these items, called "actual
materials" in the cases, 96 the optionability of such items has not been
an issue because the operators uniformly have followed the specific
language of the regulation and capitalized them. However, during the
design and onshore fabrication phases, usually consolidated in the cases
into one phase, 97 a substantial amount of costs for items such as labor,
fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., and an allocable portion of overhead
and profit is incurred.' These costs, referred to for convenience in the
regulations 99 and the cases2°° as "other costs," incurred in connection
with the onshore design and fabrication of offshore platforms, have
been the main bone of contention between the industry and the Service. 20 '
After construction, the major components20 2 of a platform usually
are loaded on a ship or barge for transportation to the platform location.
The jacket is then skidded or lifted off the ship or barge by means of
a floating crane and placed in the water. The legs are carefully flooded
while the upper portion is held in position by the crane hook. Once
the proper positioning on the ocean floor has been accomplished and
196. The origin of this term comes from Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(1), the "examples" sentence.
197. The adverb "usually" was necessitated by Exxon Corp. v, United States, 547
F.2d 548, 550 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
198. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 361 (1981); cf. Texaco,
Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
199. Reg. § 1.612-4(a).
200. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 361 (1981); Texaco, Inc.
v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
201. In Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68, 69-70, the Service conceded the optionability
of intangible costs incurred in transporting platforms to the drill site after the onshore
construction phase was completed, and those associated with the positioning, erecting,
and permanently anchoring the platform to the ocean bed. It continued this concession
throughout the Exxon, Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), Texaco, and Gulf cases.
202. The jacket, the piling, and the deck. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
324, 330 (1986); Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (S.D. Tex. 1984);
Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 358 (1981).
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the unit is leveled, the pilings are driven through the jacket legs until
the designed circumferential-friction refusal level has been met. Grouting
is poured in the annular space between the outer circumference of the
piling and the inner surface of the jacket legs. The pilings are welded
to the top of the jacket legs in order to complete the anchoring and
support of the jacket. After this is done, the deck section is lifted and
positioned on the stabilized jacket. The deck column is positioned with
the aid of stabbing guides that fit into the top of the piling, and then
welded in place. 2 3
THE LITIGATED CASES ON OFFSHORE IDC
The first major decision focusing directly on the offshore IDC issue,
Exxon Corp. v. United States,2°4 was decided by the United States Court
of Claims. Exxon's predecessor, Humble Oil and Refining Company,
had obtained shallow water offshore leases from the State of Louisiana.
In order to drill and develop these leases in 1954, Humble built six
templet-type offshore drilling and production platforms, 25 The judges
on the court agreed that a basic component, the templet, was standard
for all platforms. 206 The issue was not drawn in the Court of Claims
whether the templet design was simply a cost of production saving device
or had been adopted to facilitate salvage. However, the Tax Court,
perhaps influenced by the fact that Humble (Exxon) had salvaged com-
ponents of one of the platforms by the time its case went to trial, 20 7
stated in a subsequent decision: "The templets were clearly designed to
be salvaged as a unit and were reusable." 20 s
The construction and fabrication of the platforms followed the
normal four stages described above. Humble's engineers designed the
203. This description is a composite of those found in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 324, 328-36 (1986); Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (S.D.
Tex. 1984), and Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 360-61 (1981).
See also Linden, supra note 163, at 470-72.
204. 547 F.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
205. A templet-type platform was described by the Court of Claims as follows:
[It is a] a large deck area, on which are mounted derricks and various other
drilling paraphernalia, all supported above sea level by 'templets,' which are
compound, trussed structures, analogous in function to table legs but composed
of several large vertical steel beams and pipes (usually an even number) arranged
in a rectangular fashion with bars running between the pipes for support and
spacing. Several templets are ordinarily used to support one deck, the number
depending on the size, weight, and other features of the deck and equipment
to be installed thereon.
Id. at 549-50 n.4.
206. Id. at 551, 562.
207. Id. at 551.
208. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 387 (1981).
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platforms and drew up the plans and specifications. Its employees also
determined the drill site locations, aided by consultation with outside
soil engineers. During the land phase, when the initial prefabrications
were made, various costs were incurred, including some for labor, ma-
terials, fuel, hauling, insurance, allocated overhead, and the profit of
the marine construction contractor, who was selected on the basis of
competitive bids, under a typical fixed-price contract which included
those items. Humble also incurred directly some costs of transporting
materials which it had agreed to supply to the contractor's yard, in
addition to the costs of its own engineers who were assigned to oversee
the progress of the work at the contractor's fabrication yard and to
assure compliance by the contractor with Humble's specifications. It
also incurred the cost of its welding inspector assigned to oversee the
contractor's welders and to test the finished welds.
Once the land-phase construction contract was completed, the par-
tially constructed components of the platform were loaded on barges
for movement to the drill site. At this point, a different contractor,
acting under a cost-plus-fixed fee contract, took control and transported
the components to the location, while performing further cutting, weld-
ing, and other fabrication work en route. The skidding and lifting off
the barge, positioning, erection, and assembly of the platform on its
site then took place.
In accordance with his position in Revenue Ruling 70-596, the Com-
missioner conceded the application of the IDC option to the costs of
transporting the components to the wellsite and to those incurred in the
erection and on-site assembly of the platform. However, the Service
contested the deduction of the costs incurred for labor, fuel, repairs,
supplies, and hauling, etc., during the onshore construction of the plat-
forms, together with similar costs incurred during offshore construction
en route to the site, claiming that such costs were not subject to the
option because they were "pre-installation expenditures by which Humble
acquired what the regulation calls 'tangible property ordinarily considered
as having a salvage value."' 2°9
Both Exxon 210 and the Government agreed that the language of
Treasury Regulations § 1.612-4's immediate, and virtually identical, pred-
ecessor,21' was determinative of the controlling issue, and both parties
relied solely on such language in the regulation and argued that all
construction expenditures (except for "actual materials" such as steel
pipes, beams, etc.) both onshore and offshore qualified for the option.
209. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
210. Exxon became the owner of Humble's claim for refund as a result of the merger
of Humble into Exxon.
211. Reg. § 118, § 39.23(m)-16.
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Exxon founded its position upon the language in subsection (a)(l) which
provided that the option applied to ". . . items which in themselves do
not have a salvage value" and the following sentence: "For the purpose
of this option, labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., are not
considered as having a salvage value.... ",212 Exxon downplayed the
impact of subsection (c)(1) by citing it for the proposition that the
expenditures made nonoptional by subsection (c)(1) because they were
the means "by which the taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value" were epitomized by "actual ma-
terials in [the] structures," which had always been capitalized by Exxon.
The Government, also basing its argument solely on the language
of the regulation, took issue with Exxon's intangible versus tangible
distinction. It relied upon subsection (c)(1) as the basis for its proposed
"salvage value" test which related the costs of the tangibles to the
process by which they were incurred. Implicitly, this test embraced the
concept that certain intangibles, "in themselves" can acquire a salvage
value on the basis of the incremental value their expenditure added to
the fabricated component. 213 The Government first distinguished between
intangible costs incurred in the construction of physical structures which
in themselves do not have a salvage value (which would fall outside
subsection (c)(1)'s exclusion from, as well as being included in (a)(1)'s
inclusion in, the option) and those intangible .expenditures by which the
taxpayer acquired tangible property ordinarily considered as having a
salvage value. Then, it sought to reconcile its allowance of the greater
part of the water-phase costs by creating a category of expenditures
which did not have a salvage value because they did not create an added
value to the raw materials. 214 However, as the case was argued, the
disallowance of all land expenditures and a portion of the water-phase
expenditures was predicated on their being "acquisition" costs, as dis-
tinguished from "installation" costs. 215 Exxon replied that since the
212. Id. at subsection (a)(l), designated simply subsection (a) in Reg. § 1.612-4. This
is, of course, the literal "IDC are IDC, and are nonsalvable per se" argument set forth
supra in the text accompanying note 180.
213. Note, Qualifying Deductible Intangible Drilling Costs in Offshore Drilling Op-
erations, 8 U. Tol. L. Rev. 555, 565 (1977). Thus, it would seem that the Government
did not agree that the listed expenditures "in themselves" had no salvage value, although
it could hardly deny, in the light of its own regulation, that "in and of themselves" so
called "other costs" had no salvage value. Judge Kashiwa, dissenting in the Exxon Corp.
case, objected to the majority's "substitution" of "in and of themselves" for the re-
gulation's "in themselves" language. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 565
(Ct. Cl. 1976) (referring to pages 556 and 558).
214. This argument is inconsistent economically. Even hauling alone would produce a
place differential value.
215. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 553 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The "installation"
or "on-site" costs versus "pre-installation" or "acquisition" cost is a carryover from
1988]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
challenged costs had no salvage value (per the language of subsection
(a)(1)) and thus qualified as IDC, the Government's salvage argument
was a false and irrelevant issue. 216
The majority of the Exxon court, after examining the administrative
and legislative history of the regulation and concluding that Congress
favored a liberal interpretation of it, categorized Exxon's construction
expenditures into: (I) costs of actual materials used in the structure; (2)
labor necessary to construct the same; (3) transportation of the structure;
and (4) miscellaneous "other" costs such as repair work, fuel, supplies
and the like. The first category clearly had to be capitalized under the
regulation, but Exxon consistently had done so. The majority opinion
continued: "With equal clarity, however, the regulation grants an option
to the operator with respect to all other of the categories listed above. '21 7
It considered the only qualifications placed on the optionability of such
cost items to be that they must have been incurred in the construction
of derricks, tanks, pipelines and other physical structures necessary for
the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the production of
oil or gas, and they must not "in and of themselves" have a value.218
The majority concluded that the fact that Exxon had recovered some
materials from salvaged platforms in the past was immaterial because
the regulation made it clear that the intangible-type costs enumerated
in the regulation ("other costs") were "not considered as having a
salvage value, even though used in connection with the installation of
physical property which has a salvage value."2 19
The majority then rejected as an "emasculation of a long-standing
regulation" the I.R.S's position that the word "installation," as used
in the quoted senten.ce, limited the availability of the IDC option to
those expenditures incurred while installing the platform at the well site
no matter how necessary the pre-installation construction may have been
to the drilling and preparation of the well. Stating that the Government
had "grossly misread its own language" by seizing upon the isolated
word "installation" to support its argument, the majority construed the
Rev. Rul. 70-596's geographic distinction. One commentator has suggested that while Reg.
§. 1.612-4(c)(1) provides that if construction is done in the wells and on the property,
only the actual materials are tangible property items which the taxpayer has acquired and
which therefore must be capitalized. The converse is not necessarily true, i.e., merely
because construction is conducted off the property does not mean that the entire cost,
including the cost of assembly is an acquisition cost. Linden, Review of Offshore Drilling
- What Are Intangibles?, 26 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 441, 473 (1975).
216. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
217. Id. at 555-56, citing the first sentence of Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-16(a)(1).
218. Id. at 556.
219. Id. This was a quotation from the predecessor of Reg. § 1.612-4(a), footparagaph,
second sentence, and presupposes that the expenditures otherwise qualify for the option.
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sentence in question as being an attempt to forestall any possible con-
tention that the "other costs" in question would acquire a salvage value
simply because they were connected with the installation of admittedly
salvable property. Further, the majority rejected as "impoverished" the
Government's attempt to bolster its salvage value argument through the
use of the section 263(a) cases on capitalization, pointing out that the
real issue was the proper interpretation of section 263(c), a clear exception
to 263(a). 2 0 Finally, the majority sharply rejected the Government's
"functional" argument that an offshore drilling platform becomes com-
pletely salvaged at the instant of an oil and gas strike due to its use
as a production facility afterwards. 221
The majority's adoption of Exxon's interpretation caused it to reach
the correct result, but its failure to deal with the impact of subsection
(c) and to struggle with the definition of terms such as "actual materials"
created an aura of unfinished business. Judge Bennett, in his concurring
opinion, appreciated this fact, but he noted that, since each platform
in the case had been designed to accommodate ocean depth and current
conditions at the proposed drilling site, one was led to suspect that
platform component subassemblies were not uniformly salvable. Ascer-
tainment of the fact of salvability and the amount thereof in the year
of construction would, in Judge Bennett's opinion, depend upon fact
problems not at all readily resolved or resolvable. In order to avoid the
difficulties which would ensue for taxpayers attempting to apply the
regulation, and the I.R.S. and the courts striving to enforce it under
such circumstances, Judge Bennett chose to go along with the majority's
approach .222
Judge Kashiwa, concurring in part and dissenting in part, attempted
to meet the problem head-on. Among other things, he sought to include
the templets (and other component parts such as the cap and portal
sections) with in the meaning of "actual materials. ' 223 Proceeding on
this premise, Judge Kashiwa expressed the view that the expenditures
for wages, fuel, supplies, etc. (intangible-type costs) incurred during the
fabrication process were "[subsection (c)(1)] expenditures by which the
taxpayer . .. [acquired] tangible property ordinarily considered as having
220. Id. at 556. See also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
221. Note, supra note 213, at 570, characterized the Government's argument as "fal-
lacious." It points out, correctly, the fact that the issue in Exxon was not the size of
the deduction but the propriety thereof. Id. at 571.
222. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 561 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
223. Judge Kashiwa took pains to note that since each platform was of templet-type
basic design, his opinion was limited to such platforms and did not consider with respect
to the IDC option the other types of offshore structures used by oil companies such as
caissons and jacket-type platforms. Id. at 561 n.23.
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a salvage value," and hence, were not optional, recoverable only through
depreciation. 224 He sought to bolster this interpretation by a review of
the history of the IDC option. In making this.review, Judge Kashiwa
stressed the language of T.D. 2447, which sounded in terms of "inci-
dental expenses" which "do not [necessarily] enter into and form a part
of the capital invested or property account, ' 225 and "costs which in
themselves do not have a salvage value." 226 He then orchestrated these
phrases into a "recurring theme to determine qualification of expen-
ditures for the IDC option" as limiting optionability to those "expen-
ditures by which the taxpayer does not acquire 'tangible property ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value."'' 227
Judge Kashiwa took issue with the majority's interpretation that the
salvage value phrase, as used in subsection (c)(l), related only to the
tangible raw materials from which the templets and other basic com-
ponents were fabricated. In his opinion, the "actual materials" term
used in the examples set forth in the second sentence of subsection (c)(1)
was sufficiently broad to encompass the fabricated templet basic unit
component. 22 Based upon this conclusion, Judge Kashiwa subscribed to
the Government's "installation versus acquisition" argument, which he
summarized as follows:
The labor, fuel, etc., used in erecting the platform structure,
or in transporting the structure to the drilling site, add no value
to the structure which can be salvaged when the drilling operation
is completed and, hence, do not "in themselves" have salvage
value. On the other hand, labor, fuel, etc., used in fabricating
the salvageable components of such a structure do add value
to and become integrated with the tangible basic materials com-
prising the component part. Therefore, the items, both intangible
and tangible materials, have salvage value "in themselves." Hav-
ing a salvage value "in themselves," the items do not qualify
for the IDC option: the cost of the items must be capitalized
and recovered only through depreciation. 2
29
224. Id. at 562. Thus, Judge Kashiwa accepted the "value added" concept implicit
in the Government's argument. See supra text accompanying note 213.
225. Id. at 563. As was set forth supra note 26, this language was deleted in 1981
by T.D. 2690.
226. This concept was introduced in 1933 by T.D. 4333, although as Judge Kashiwa
correctly observes, the restated regulation was said, by the Treasury, not to make any
"change in administrative policy or in the practice under the regulations." See supra
notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
227. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 564 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (thus consciously,
or unconsciously, prioritizing subsection (c)(1) over subsection (a)(l) of the 1.612-4 reg-
ulation).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 565-66.
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The second decision involving offshore IDC was handed down by
the Tax Court in 1981 in the case of Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v.
Commissioner.230 During the years 1970 and 1971, the taxpayer ("In-
diana"), through its wholly-owned subsidiaries, constructed and installed
offshore drilling platforms in various locations throughout the world.
23
Unlike the Exxon case, none of the nine offshore platforms involved
in the controversy were of templet design but were of the 4-pile tender
(3 platforms) and the 8-pile self-contained (6 platforms) basic design. 23 2
The design, fabrication, and erection of the platforms were completed
utilizing the normal four-stage construction process. 233 Each of the nine
platforms consisted of three major units, which were constructed sep-
arately onshore: (1) the deck, (2) the jacket, and (3) the pilings. 3 4
During the construction and fabrication phase, Indiana incurred costs
for materials acquired from outside sources (conceded to be nonoptional)
and for "other costs" such as labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies,
etc., and an allocable portion of overhead and profit. 235 Prior to this
case, Indiana had expensed the "other costs" in the load-out, trans-
portation, and installation phases but had capitalized such costs incurred
in the first (construction and fabrication) phrase. Probably as a result
of the Exxon case, Indiana, in addition to the instant petition, filed 3
petitions in the Tax Court, alleging error in the capitalization of such
"other costs" in the first phase and claiming them as IDC deductible
expense. It compromised with the Service for taxable years 1960-1969,
agreeing not to change its treatment of such "other costs." Hence no
question was raised over depreciation deductions taken in 1970 and 1971
with respect to such capitalized "other costs" incurred in prior years.
However, Indiana was litigating its contention that the "other costs"
incurred in the first (onshore construction) phase also represented de-
ductible IDC.
After disposing of the Service's preliminary argument that I.R.C.
§ 446(e) precluded Indiana from changing its "method of accounting"
230. 77 T.C. 349 (1981).
231. Id. at 352-58. The locations of the platforms in questions were the Gulf of
Mexico, the Leman Field in the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea, and fields off
the coast of Trinidad. "Constructed" carries the usual offshore connotation which includes
construction by contractors on Indiana's behalf.
232. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 357-58 (1981).
233. Id. at 358; see supra text accompanying notes 196-203.
234. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 358 (1981).
235. Id. at 361-63. Included also in the court's "other costs" were the cost of the
rolling and the welding of steel sheet into tubing or "cans" which were used to form
jacket legs, jacket bracing, or pilings. These costs, which represented 15% of the "other
costs," were found to be optional even under subsection (c)(l) because the "cans" were
found by the court to be tangible property usable only within a structure which itself
was not ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. Id. at 403.
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without the consent of the Service on the ground that the treatment of
the IDC's was "otherwise provided [for] in [section 263(c)]," thus making
446(e) inapplicable by its own terms, 23 6 the Tax Court squarely addressed
the opposing theories propounded by the majority and dissenting opi-
nions in Exxon. The court reviewed the Exxon majority's opinion, as
crystallized in Judge Davis' concurring opinion, and embellished by Judge
Bennett's concurring opinion, in which the savings in judicial effort
inherent in the per se IDC approach were stressed, and Judge Kashiwa's
dissenting opinion, as epitomized by the statement quoted above, and
remarked that the authors of those various opinions had set forth the
major arguments for and against the deduction of Indiana's "other
costs.' '237
The Tax Court, however, refused to adopt an either/or approach;
instead it perceived the necessity for a synthesis of a broad rationale
from which a proper, detailed holding could be obtained. 2as First the
court made an analysis along the lines of that contained above in "The
Language of the IDC Option." It then noted that Indiana's (the Exxon
majority's) "purchase versus construction" test of optionality was "flawed
conceptually" because it did not take into account the fact that even
"purchased" materials contain intangible costs. Thus, some limitation
had to be provided, because each level of production is the result of
the expenditure of intangible-type costs which, ultimately, are expended
for drilling and development. It was precisely for this purpose of lim-
itation that the salvage value concept was adopted, according to the
Tax Court, which stated:
In excluding from the option expenditures for ordinarily sal-
vageable tangible property, the Treasury, and now Congress,
appears to have drawn the line such that expenditures that
ordinarily are economically unrecoverable should the well be
dry, whether or not such expenditures are "represented by phys-
ical property," are to be included within the option, whereas
expenditures for items which ordinarily are recoverable, even if
the well is dry, are excluded from such option.23 9
236. Id. at 382-84, putting aside the "prepaid intangibles" issues involved in Keller
v. Commissioner, 725 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1984) and Levy v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d
1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
237. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 387-90 (1981).
238. Id. at 393.
239. Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added). The court may have treated Indiana's "purchase
versus construction" argument a bit roughly here. The mere fact that intangibles may
have been involved in the production of a purchased "actual material" does not mean
that the purchase - vs. construction test does not act as a limitation; quite the converse,
it would disqualify such intangible from optionality. See Texaco, Inc. v. United States,
598 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 n.10 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
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The Tax Court then characterized this economic recovery rule in
terms of a "risk analysis." It cited a number of prior decisions that
had linked the allowance of the IDC deduction to the bearing of risk. 240
From this "inextricable relationship" between IDC and risk, the court
deduced the relevance of the phrase "ordinarily considered as having a
salvage value" as used in subsection (c)(l); namely, if an item "ordi-
narily" has salvage value, expenditures for (and connected with) that
item are not subject to the risk of the drilling activity - but if it does
not have such salvage value, then expenditures represented by that item
are very much at risk.
That analysis brought the court face-to-face with the Tenth Circuit's
Harper Oi 2 4' language. Conceding that portions of Justice Blackmun's
opinion could be taken to imply that salvage value was not an inevitable
companion of nonoption status, the Tax Court seized upon (and slightly
manhandled) Justice Blackmun's reference to Williams and Meyers, Oil
and Gas Terms, 242 as saying that usually surface casing is cemented (thus
rendering it non-salvageable) only in the completion of a producing
well. 243 Having thus remolded the language, the Tax Court reconciled
Harper Oil with its risk analysis concept by saying that Justice Blackmun,
relying upon this (recast) statement, could easily conclude that casing
is not cemented until and unless oil was discovered in paying quantities,
and therefore its cost was not at such risk as should qualify for the
IDC option. 24
The Court then articulated its risk analysis formula for determination
of the salvage value limitations on IDC optionality in the offshore
platform context:
[W]hen the ultimate tangible property resulting from a chain of
drilling, development, construction, etc., activities (such activities
240. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 397 (1981).
241. 425 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1970).
242. 425 F.2d at 1342.
Casing appears to be a generic term in the industry. One authority says, 'Most
oil wells are completed with two strings of cemented casing, the surface pipe
and the production string,' but also speaks of a possible additional casing led:
the so-called intermediate or salt string]. H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and
Gas Terms (2d ed.) p. 46. The same work observes, p. 364, 'It is customary
to set [cement] casing in the completion at a producing well.' The record here
is to like effect.
Id.
243. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 399 (1981). This version
may surprise the inhabitants of the oil patch.
244. Id. A proponent of the "IDC's are non-salvable per se" theory might properly
suggest that Harper Oil rested on the specific enumeration of casing as a component of
tangible property in subsection (c)(l), to which the "ordinarily-considered-as-having-a-
salvage-value" test clearly was applicable.
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being of the type covered by the IDC option) is ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value, none of the costs of
acquiring or constructing such property are IDC. If such ultimate
tangible property is not ordinarily considered as having a salvage
value, then the intangible-type costs expended to integrate ma-
terials which were, prior to such integration, usable in such a
fashion that they would be ordinarily considered as having a
salvage value, into a component which is, after such integration,
not ordinarily considered as having a salvage value, are IDC.
Any further intangible-type costs expended to integrate this "first
unsalvageable component" into the ultimate tangible property,
which is not ordinarily considered as having a salvage value,
are IDC.245
The Court illustrated the application of its formula by a hypothetical
example: the costs of converting iron ore into salvageable angle iron
are not IDC's, and the costs of turning angle iron into a salvageable
templet would not be IDC's.24 However, the costs of turning sheet
metal, which up to that point was usable in such a fashion as to be
"ordinarily considered as having a salvage value" into an unsalvageable
piling (assuming it is not ordinarily considered as having a salvage value)
would, assuming that the platform itself was unsalvageable, qualify as
IDC's.
Addressing the issue before it, the Tax Court applied its newly
articulated risk analysis test by deciding first whether the offshore plat-
forms involved were, as a whole, ordinarily considered as having a
salvage value. Its answer to this question was that the jacket-type plat-
forms in issue clearly were not so considered. Since the answer was
negative, a second question had to be answered, namely, were the
intangible-type costs in issue incurred to integrate materials that, prior
to such integrations, would ordinarily be considered as having a salvage
value, into components which, after such integration, were not ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value? The court found that they were
so incurred. The costs involved were of the intangible type of costs
mentioned in the second and fifth sentences of subsection (a); they were
incurred to fabricate "materials," which were tangible property ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value, into discrete components, such as
"cans," jacket, pilings and deck, none of which was found by the
court, after detailed examination, to be ordinarily considered to have a
salvage value, hence qualifying the intangible costs for the IDC option. 247
245. Id. at 399-400.
246. Id. at 400. The reader will observe that this conflicts squarely with the Court
of Claim's majority opinion in Exxon.
247. Id. at 401-03.
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Texaco, Inc. v. United States2 41 was decided by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas on September 28, 1984.
Texaco had installed platforms in the Gulf of Mexico off of the Louisiana
and Texas coast, Copake Inlet, Alaska, and the Santa Barbara Channel,
California. Each platform was constructed, transported, and installed
by independent contractors under the operator's supervision following
the normal four-stage process.2 49 Texaco incurred costs, as had Exxon
and Indiana, during the design and construction phase of platform
development, for materials and "other costs" (the usual labor, fuel,
hauling, supplies, etc., and an allocable portion of overhead and profit
of the contractors). Texaco followed the standard industry practice of
capitalizing the costs of the actual materials; hence, the sole issue in
the case was the appropriate treatment of the "other costs" incurred
in the design and construction phase of platform development. As was
the case in Indiana, no templet-type platforms were involved;2 50 each
platform was designed and constructed for use at a specific site and
the evidence revealed that, as a practical matter, neither any platform
nor any major component was salvageable.25
Texaco relied upon the majority opinion in Exxon,2 2 while the
Government argued that the Indiana risk analysis test was the proper
criterion. Moreover, the Government attempted to "leverage" its position
by arguing that, under risk analysis approach, salvageability should be
determined at the end of the drilling phase. The District Court rejected
the Exxon majority's IDC per se argument on the same ground adopted
by the Tax Court in Indiana, saying: "the tangible costs of converting
raw materials, which in themselves do not have an intrinsic salvage
value, into salvageable components would preserve the integrity and
value of the intangible cost. ' 253 But the Government's attempt to take
a "second bite" by urging application of the salvage value test at the
time the tangible property (with which the intangible "other costs" are
associated) was no longer useful to the taxpayer, was found by the court
to be unsound.
248. 598 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
249. Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1165, 1167-68 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
250. Id. at 1173 n.13. There were 14 self-contained platforms, 12 tender platforms,
5 three-pile well protector platforms, and 1 caisson jacket platform. Id. at 1167-68.
251. Id. at 1176-77.
252. Id. at 1172. Of course, Texaco argued, in the alternative, that in the event that
the risk-analysis formula was held to be applicable, its "other costs" would still be
optional because neither the platforms nor their components were salvageable. Id. at 1976-
77.
253. Id. at 1172. Translated, this means that because their value will be recovered
when the salvageable component is salvaged, if the drilling is unsuccessful, there is no
need to allow the IDC treatment.
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After reviewing the Harper Oil case and its integration into the risk
analysis of the Tax Court in Indiana, the Texaco court held that although
the usual test of salvage value should be applied at the time the property
was no longer useful to the taxpayer in his own particular trade or
business, such test's modification wrought by subsection (c)(1) of the
IDC regulation through the phrase "ordinarily considered as" having a
salvage value, requires that the test be applied at the time the property
is acquired by the taxpayer. 2 4 Applying the risk-analysis test, viewed as
of the time of acquisition, the court found that neither Texaco's plat-
forms nor their major components were "ordinarily considered as having
a salvage value."
The most recent case is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,211 involving
a number of offshore platforms installed in the Gulf of Mexico during
1975 and in the North Sea during the years between 1977 and 1984.
Again, no templet-type platforms were involved; all of the Gulf of
Mexico platforms were self-contained with their major components being
the deck, jacket, and piling. 25 6 The platforms in the North Sea likewise
were all self-contained, but because there were different working interest
owners and different lessor governments involved, no two platforms
were designed alike. 2 7 The usual four-phase process of onshore design
and construction, load-out, transportation to site, and on-site installation
was followed. 2 s The sole issue was the eligibility of "other costs,"
incurred in the first phase, for optional expense treatment as IDC's
under I.R.C. § 263(c) and Reg. § 1.612-4.
The distance between the contending parties' positions had narrowed
since the Texaco case; the battleground was confined to the question
whether the platforms at issue or their major components would "or-
dinarily be considered as having a salvage value," and the main line
of resistance was the point in time at which the platforms or their major
components should be examined to determine whether they are "ordi-
254. Id. at 1175. The Government was overreaching on this argument. At best, if the
court had required Texaco to wait until the platforms (and/or its components) no longer
were useful to it before a determination was made, the suspense account status of the
costs would produce the same results economically as if Texaco had been forced to
capitalize them-a sub-rosa "repeal" of the IDC option. Realistically, to adopt the
Government's position would mean that no platform from which any production was
obtained could qualify for the option.
255. 87 T.C. 324 (1986).
256. Id. at 330.
257. Id. at 333-34.
258. Id. at 174. The only "new wrinkle" in Gulf was due to the larger structures
required in the North Sea than in the Gulf of Mexico; thus resulting in a flotation element
being built into the structures so that the deck or module support frame could be floated
out to the site as one unit and erected by controlled flooding. Id. at 331.
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narily considered as having a salvage value." The Government contended
that the examination should be made at the time drilling was terminated,
the same position that it had unsuccessfully taken in the Texaco court.
It attempted to subvert the risk-analysis test through the use of a
syllogism: (1) once the platform was no longer used for drilling, it no
longer was at risk; (2) IDC's and risk are inextricable related; (3)
therefore, the examination should be made when the drilling ceased. 25 9
The Tax Court was not deceived by this legal legerdemain. It noted
that the practical effect of adopting the Government's choice of timing
would result in denial of the option in the case of any platform from
which production was attained. 26° It clarified what "risk" in its risk
analysis meant, specifically, the general risk of exploration for, drilling,
and producing hydrocarbons - which risk does not cease at an arbitrary
point in time, such as the end of drilling a particular well, prior to the
end of the use of the platform in the operator's trade or business.
Finally, the court made this interesting observation with respect to the
term "actual materials" used in subsection (c):
Past opinions have differentiated between the "actual materials"
referred to in section 1.612-4(c), Income Tax Regs., and other
costs and concluded that the physical and tangible materials that
are transformed via labor, fuel, etc., into the desired assets for
drilling are the "actual materials" rather than the completed
platforms or their major components (deck, jacket, piles, etc.)
as urged by [the Government]. The result of this conclusion is
that the availability of the IDC option for the costs at issue
will depend on whether these costs are expenditures by which
the taxpayer has acquired tangible property ordinarily considered
having salvage value. Sec. 1.612-4(c), Income Tax Regs. 26'
CONCLUSION
The IDC regulation, in virtually its present form, dates back to
1943,262 and, except for administrative tinkering with the question of
259. Id. at 345. This argument proves the old saying: Allow me to choose my premises,
and I'll always win the argument.
260. Id.; see also supra note 253. The court also noted that the timing of the
determination of whether a platform can ordinarily be considered as having a salvage
value must be consistent with that of the depreciation regulations because if the platforms
do not qualify for IDC, they do qualify for depreciation. Under Reg. § 1.167(a) and
(c)(l), the amount of salvage value upon which depreciation is taken is determined at the
time the asset is acquired. Therefore, such time is the appropriate moment for the
determination of whether the asset is ordinarily considered as having a salvage value under
Reg. § 1.612-4(c). Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 324, 345-46 (1986).
261. 87 T.C. at 344.
262. T.D. 5276, 1943 C.B. 151.
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who was entitled to elect the option to expense, 263 the main framework
of the regulation, including the affirmative and negative definitions of
optionable items found in sections (a) and (c), was established in 1932.264
It is to be expected that the phraseology of regulations drawn in light
of industry practices so long ago would prove difficult to apply to the
advanced technology of modern offshore drilling. 265 The Service's attempt
in 1970266 to apply the regulations to the offshore drilling industry can
be described best as misguided. 267 The kindest thing that can be said
for it is that it did serve to focus attention on the problem.
Unfortunately, the ensuing litigation has not been adequately illu-
minating. Although each case reached the same result, allowing the
respective offshore operators to elect to expense the intangibles incurred
during the off-site, onshore construction phase, a deep conceptual schism
has arisen. The Court of Claim's 26 approach, faced with the facts that
the basic discrete component (the templet) of the platforms in Exxon
was standardized, and that some actually had been salvaged, drew a
distinction between the intangible costs enumerated in subsection (a),
such as labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., which are not con-
sidered as having a salvage value, and the costs of physical, tangible
items ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. The only require-
ments for optionality that needed to be met by the first category of
costs, said the Exxon majority, was that they must have been incurred
"in the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and other physical
structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells" and that they must
not "in and of themselves" have a salvage value. There was no question
as to the factual fulfillment of the first requirement, and the majority
felt that the regulation conclusively provided the second qualification; 269
hence, the majority brusquely rejected the Government's salvage argu-
ment as immaterial.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 57-64. Among the changes was that of the
optionee from "taxpayer" to "operator" and expansion of the optionee's right to contract
out his drilling without disqualification even through "turnkey" contracts, but not through
"obligation" wells.
264. T.D. 4333, 11-1 C.B. 31 (1931).
265. Cf. Note, Qualifying Deductible Intangible Drilling Costs in Offshore Drilling
Operations, 8 U. Tol. L. Rev. 555, 577 (1977).
266. Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68.
267. Cf. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547, F.2d 548, 560 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Davis, J.,
concurring).
268. More accurately, the majority of the court's approach.
269. The majority relied upon the seventh sentence of Reg. § 1.612-4(a): "For the
purposes of this option, labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., are not considered
as having a salvage value, even if used in connection with the installation of physical
property which as a salvage value." The preceding sentence of the regulation actually
refers to items which "in themselves" do not have a salvage value.
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The majority's approach has the advantage of simplicity. It avoids
the extended scrutiny envisioned by Judge Bennett which would otherwise
be required of the operator in the first instance, the Service on ex-
amination, and ultimately the courts on a case-by-case basis, into exactly
what components of the final assembly could be saved and subsequently
used. In Judge Bennett's view, such an inquiry is an a priori venture
into fact questions not at all readily resolved or resolvable.2 7 0 Moreover,
although logic and taxation are not always the best of friends, 271 the
majority's view is logically sound: it is more natural and less strained
to read the regulation, in view of its structure, as placing primary stress
on the optionality of all intangible drilling and development costs in-
curred in the development of the operator's offshore properties and
employing the "salvage value" concept as a minor theme dealing with
the other side of the question - denial of the option in the case of
the physical and tangible materials which ordinarily are considered sal-
vable. 272
The opposing view, originally expoused by Judge Kashiwa in his
dissenting opinion in Exxon,2 73 and fine-tuned by the Tax Court in its
Indiana opinion, 27 4 employed a more in-depth analysis of the various
subsections of the regulation and attempted to give equal time to both
subsections (a) and (c). The court found fault with the operator's attempt
to confine subsection (c)'s limitation role to purchased "actual mate-
rials," as opposed to the costs of work performed by or on behalf of
the operator in order to utilize such materials in the construction of
the platform. This proved too much, for each level of production from
the time the native raw materials were extracted from the soil until the
time the final platform was constructed involved the expenditure of
intangible costs. In lieu of that, the Tax Court came up with its "risk
analysis" as the appropriate tool for demarcation between optional and
nonoptional items, and declared that its analysis gave the proper weight
to the phrase "ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. '
27 It
constructed its theory by correctly postulating a relationship between the
grant of the option to expense IDC's and congressional desire to en-
270. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 560-61 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Bennett, J.,
concurring).
271. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 552, (1923) (McReynolds, J., con-
curring).
272. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 547 F.2d 548, 559 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Davis, J.,
concurring).
273. Id. at 564-66; see quotation from Judge Kashiwa's dissenting opinion in supra
text accompanying note 229.
274. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 393-400 (1981).
275. Id. at 395-97.
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courage operators to undertake the risk of drilling.27 6 The court then
assumed that Congress drew the line between optional and nonoptional
items on the basis that costs which ordinarily are economically unre-
coverable should the well be dry, whether or not such costs were rep-
resented by physical property, were optional, whereas costs which
ordinarily are recoverable even if the well is dry were nonoptional. From
these two hypotheses it determined the relevance of the phrase "ordinarily
considered as having a salvage value." The court adroitly manipulated
Justice Blackmun's language in Harper Oil to the point where it stated
that Justice Blackmun, by relying on the (Tax Court's misstated) "opin-
ion of an authority" that usually surface casing is cemented (thus
rendering it nonsalvageable) only in the case of a producing well, "could
easily conclude [under the Tax Court's risk analysis) that casing is not
cemented until and unless oil or gas was discovered in commercially
producible quantities and, therefore, is not at risk such that the costs
of such casing should qualify for the IDC option. '27 7 Using its "risk
analysis," the Tax Court expounded the view that all of the operator's
IDC-type expenditures to produce a material that ordinarily was con-
sidered to be salvageable, and all such expenditures incurred to integrate
materials which prior to such integration were ordinarily considered as
having a salvage value into larger units which themselves were ordinarily
considered to have salvage value, were nonoptional.
The Texaco and Gulf Oil cases followed the Indiana case rationale
and added only the refinements that the "not ordinarily considered as
having a salvage value" test was to be judged by total industry practice,
not just the use by a particular taxpayer, and that the appropriate point
in time to make this judgment was at the time the item was acquired
or constructed. Significantly, all three risk analysis cases reached the
same result of optionability as did the Exxon case, but were based on
more current industry practice.
While the Tax Court's risk-analysis test represents a good faith,
scholarly attempt to give both subsection (a) and subsection (c) of Reg.
§ 1.612-4 as much meaning as possible, the analysis contains some very
serious flaws. First, the Tax Court has deliberately chosen a more
complicated approach then that of the Exxon majority, but without the
redeeming grace of reaching a more desirable result. It has added an-
other, nonstatutory requirement for optionability. Second, it directly
contradicts the regulation when, for the purpose of the IDC option,
the costs of labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., expended to
276. United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 452 (5th Cir. 1968); Sun Co. v. Com-
missioner, 677 F.2d 294, 299 (3rd Cir. 1982); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner
68 T.C. 325, 350 (1977); Haass v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 43, 50 (1970).
277. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 399 (1981).
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produce, or to integrate ordinarily salvageable material into, physical
property which has a salvage value are nonoptional .2 7  Third, even if
risk were a true proxy for optionability, the entire history of its use in
this context has shown that it is too unruly a horse to ride. Early on,
it was judicially encrusted upon the regulation by courts faced with the
issue of who was entitled to the option in situations involving obligation
wells279 and turnkey drilling contracts, 280 only to have the Commissioner
overturn the turnkey drilling contract doctrine and modify the obligation
well doctrine in T.D. 5276.21 Thereafter, the concept of risk was pivotal
in the "carried interest" controversy, which caused the Service to delay
the congressionally mandated promulgation of IDC regulations under
the 1954 Code for 11 years, at which time it simply republished the
old regulations in force under the 1939 Code. 212 Fourth, and more
importantly, the Indiana court's foundation for its risk-analysis test is
pure sand. Justice Blackmun in Harper Oil did not say that usually
surface casing is cemented (thus rendering it nonsalvageable) only in the
completion of a producing well;2 83 he simply quoted Williams and Meyer's
for the straightforward comment that "[ilt is customary to set [cement]
casing in the completion of a producing well.... "284 The court's mis-
reading of Harper Oil Co. is reminiscent of that of another old Equity
draftsman, the Lord Chancellor in Iolanthe, who deftly doctored the
wording of a law to get a diametrically opposite result.2 8 Moreover,
the court misperceived the reality of the risk undertaken in offshore
drilling. Unlike onshore drilling, it is not a well-by-well situation, but,
at the very least, a platform-by-platform risk. Merely because one well
might be completed successfully does not make the entire offshore project
278. The court's statement is paraphrased; for the exact language see supra text
accompanying note 244. By not giving credence to the Treasury's own language in section
1.612-4(a), the court commits an egregious error. Recognition by the Treasury that risk
is the basis for the option obviously is the reason for placing the language "even though
used in connection with the installation of physical property which has a salvage value"
in the regulation. Denial of optionality of otherwise qualifying IDC's clearly undermines
the language of the regulation and the basis for the option.
279. E.g., Hardesty vs. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1942); Hunt v. Com-
missioner, 135 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1943); see supra text accompanying notes 100-102 for
discussion of this issue in the F.H.E. Oil Co. case.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
281. i943 C.B. 151.
282. The history of this fiasco is set forth in supra text accompanying notes 128-47.
283. See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 349, 399 (1981), for this
incorrect characterization of Justice Blackmon's words.
284. Harper Oil Co. v. United States, 425 F.2d 1335, 1342 (10th Cir. 1970).
285. Gilbert & Sullivan, lolanthe, Act II: "Allow me, as an old Equity draftsman,
to make a suggestion. The subtleties of the legal mind are equal to the emergency. The
thing is really quite simple - the insertion of a single word will do it. Let it stand that
every fairy shall die who doesn't marry a mortal, and there you are, out of your difficulty
at once!"
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successful. The totality of the wells drilling in that location must produce
oil .or gas in commercial quantities, and they must do so before the
platform is destroyed by fire, by water, by wind or by blowout, and
before external market factors foreclose the possibility of ever recovering
the tremendous sums invested. Since risk can be defined as a composite
probability that the funds expended will fail to obtain an economic
benefit and that other property (or money) will be lost because the
original expenditure has incurred an economic detriment in excess of
the loss of the expenditure itself, it is easy to see that very high risk
expenditures are at issue,2 86 not the "sure thing" that the Indiana court
appearently visualized.
RESOLUTION
The Treasury Department has overloaded the judiciary by failing to
update the language of the IDC regulations to comport with current
offshore drilling technology. This paper expressed dissatisfaction with
the risk analysis approach that the courts appear to have adopted. A
seemingly obvious conclusion would be to recommend that the Service
rectify the situation by undertaking a comprehensive, procedurally proper
process of amending Reg. § 1.612-4, with ample provision for input by
the industry and other interested parties. Implicit in such an approach
would be the prompt withdrawal of Rev. Rul. 70-596, whose sole virtue
is the fact that it alerted the tax community and the industry to the
difficulties inherent in applying an archaic regulation to conditions of
modern sophisticated offshore technology.
Unfortunately, logic cannot be relied upon in this matter. The Serv-
ice, in Gen. Couns. Mem 39564 (Oct. 27, 1986), has evinced an im-
placable determination to deny to operators the benefits of the I.R.C.
§ 263(c) option to expense IDC-type expenditures incurred "away from
the property," principally aiming at onshore construction costs. In its
October, 1986 memorandum, the General Counsel reached the conclusion
that, for purposes of qualification for expense treatment, a distinction
should be drawn between IDC's incurred "on the property" (eligible
for the option) and those incurred "away from the property" (non-
optional). The purported justification ignored the Exxon, Indiana, and
Gulf decisions, and cited only the Texaco case, the most poorly reasoned
decision of the four. It seized upon the phrases "construction on the
property" (in Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(2)), "constructed in the wells and on
the property" (in subsection (c)(1)) and "operation of the wells and
other facilities on the property" (in subsection (c)(2)) as support for its
286. Linden, Review of Offshore Drilling - What are Intangibles? 26 Inst. on Oil &
Gas L. & Tax'n 441, 454-57 (1975).
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newly adopted position. This language has been in the regulation since
1943 and is exactly the same today as it was in 1970 when Gen. Couns.
Mem. 34346 (Sept. 14, 1970) stated flatly that the on-site/off-site dis-
tinction was not supportable.
What has changed since that time? Not the language and not the
determination of the Service to deny the option to on-shore construction
IDC's. What has changed is the holding in Indiana, Texaco and Gulf
that neither the offshore platforms nor their major components (pilings,
jackets and decks) are "ordinarily considered as having salvage value."
Having lost on what Gen. Couns. Memo. 34346 declared was the sole
supportable ground for denial of the option, the Service now asserts
that when the Service uses an expression in Reg. § 1.612-4, it means
just what the Service chooses it to mean - neither more nor less.
Moreover, in true Orwellian "think-speak" fashion, this meaning can
change from time to time, and is to be treated as if the regulation
always has meant what the Service now says it does.
The importance of the offshore drilling industry to the nation's
economy and its security, not to mention the Government's proprietary
interest as virtually the only lessor involved, is far too great to place
the fate of the IDC option in the hands of the Service. Therefore, the
only conclusion that can safely be reached is that Congress must address
the problem squarely and, by legislation, make it unmistakably clear
that I.R.C. § 263(c) grants to operators the option currently to deduct
IDC's incurred in the construction of offshore drilling platforms and
their components at onshore or other economically efficient construction
sites including, but not limited to, the drill site.
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